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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, 
: Case No. 2003 0817-CA 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this direct 
appeal from class A misdemeanor convictions entered in a court of record. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Is the communications fraud statute unconstitutional? 
This issue poses a question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Wood 
v. University of Utah Medical Center. 2002 UT 134, ^ 7, 67 P.3d 436. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by motion, memoranda and argument, and 
by the entry of conditional pleas expressly preserving Mr. Norris' right to appeal this issue 
(R. 37-80, 113, 1822). 
2. Did the trial court lack jurisdiction? 
This issue poses a question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Security 
Inv. Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App. 131,f 8,47P.3d97, cert, denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by motion, memoranda and argument, and 
by the entry of conditional pleas preserving Mr. Norris' right to appeal this issue (R. 109-117, 
159-163, 283-86, 1822). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are copied in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
On September 8, 2003, Norris entered conditional no contest pleas to two counts of 
attempted communications fraud, expressly preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality 
of the charging statute, and the court's jurisdiction (R. 1814-1822). 
Because Norris had already served the maximum time, Judge Reese closed the case, 
and granted Norris credit for time served (R. 1823). 
Trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 1829). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because there was no trial, the key facts are procedural, and pertain to the claims that 
the lower court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Norris' case and that the 
communications fraud statute is unconstitutional. 
West Valley City originally chose to bring the prosecution after the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office declined to prosecute it after the prosecutors determined the case was a 
civil contractual dispute (R. 1861 at 4-5). 
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West Valley City charged Norris in the name of the State of Utah in case number 
941004929, with four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud allegedly occurring on 
May 12, 1994, and the bail was set at $2000 (R. 165, 621-22).1 
After Norris challenged the West Valley City information because it alleged no 
victims, values, or specific facts regarding the charges, West Valley filed an amended 
information on October 2, 1995, charging four class A misdemeanor counts of 
communications fraud against four different victims on or about March, April and/or May 
of 1993, alleging a value of more than $300 in each count (R. 646-47). 
Norris moved to dismiss the amended West Valley City information on statute of 
limitations grounds and because the original information failed to state an offense and thus 
failed to establish jurisdiction. 
While reviewing the matter, Circuit Judge Watson dismissed the case because he 
determined that he had no jurisdiction because the case should have been filed as a felony 
case, based on the fact that the money involved in one victim's case exceeded the $1,000 
jurisdictional amount for the circuit court, and because the aggregate amounts in the case 
involving four victims and $300 in each count required district court jurisdiction (R. 32, 36-
37, 290, 624-27, 682-684, 698). 
[The various informations filed against Norris as a result of the same criminal 
episode are copied in the addendum to this brief 
Counsel for Norris has designated as part of the record on appeal all of the 
pleadings files from the related cases. For clarity, however, in this brief, counsel cites 
only to the pleadings files in the last case filed, district court case number 971008355. 
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The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to this Court in case number 
960151-CA(R. 165,700-702). 
While the West Valley City appeal was pending, on September 30, 1996, the County 
Attorney's Office, acting in the name of the state of Utah, charged Norris in case number 
961020866 with eleven counts of third degree felony communications fraud occurring in 
May of 1993, based on the same facts as the original West Valley case, but without naming 
any victims (R. 49-53, 128, 165, 176-180). The information listed bail in the amount of 
$75,000 (R. 49). 
On December 10,1996, Judge Palmer quashed the charges in case number 961020866 
because the West Valley City appeal was still pending (R. 166). He indicated that he would 
not hear the case until the West Valley case was completely disposed of (R. 131). 
That same day, West Valley moved this Court to dismiss its appeal, because the State 
would prosecute the same conduct at issue in the West Valley case, in new felony charges, 
but could not do so until the appeal was dismissed (R. 742). 
On January 21, 1997, Judge Hilder ordered all records in case number 961020866 
expunged (R. 281). 
This Court dismissed the West Valley appeal on March 26, 1997 (R. 785). 
On April 2, 1997, the State refiled ten third degree felony charges against Norris in 
case number 971005698 (R. 55-60, 166, 182-87). In this information, each count named a 
separate specific victim (R. 55-58). 
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The probable cause statement indicated that the case was based on police report 
number 94-253 76 (R. 59), the same police report underlying case number 961020866 (R. 53), 
which report should have been expunged pursuant to Judge Hilder's expungement order (R. 
281). 
The prosecutor later conceded that the ten victims were all involved in the same 
criminal scheme as was underlying the original West Valley informations, although seven 
of the victims were not alleged in the amended West Valley charges (R. 1860 at5-10, 12-13, 
20). 
The information listed $75,000 in bail (R. 55). 
The information indicated that there had been no prior related cases (R. 60), despite 
the fact that there had been two prior cases. 
On April 11, 1997, Judge Dever dismissed case number 971005698 as well, ruling 
that the State could not refile until the remittitur in the West Valley City case issued (R. 34, 
166; R. 1860 at 27). 
This Court issued the remittitur on May 13, 1997 (R. 208). 
Norris moved to recall the remittitur, because this Court issued it prematurely (R. 41). 
On May 15, 1997, the State again refiled, alleging twenty third degree felony counts 
in case number 971008355 (R. 12-21, 62-70, 189-199). Each of the twenty counts in the 
information made the same allegation, although there were two counts for each of the ten 
victims named in the prior case (R. 2-9). 
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These were the same victims that the prosecutor conceded were all involved in the 
same criminal scheme as was underlying the original West Valley informations (R. 1860 at 
5-10, 12-13,20). 
This filing was again based (R. 9) on the same police report (R. 53), which should 
have been expunged pursuant to Judge Hilder's order (R. 281). 
At the time that 971008355 was filed, the West Valley case was on appeal, and case 
number 971005698 was set for a hearing before Judge Dever, because there was a pending 
motion to dismiss with prejudice (R. 1861 at 7-8, 16). 
However, the portion of the information which is supposed to reflect "prior related 
cases" in the last information filed again indicated that there were "none." (R. 11). 
Like the number of charges, the amount of bail in the last refiling doubled, to 
$150,000 (R. 62). 
Judge Reese permitted the prosecutors to file this information, but informed them that 
they could not proceed on it until the remittitur arrived in the West Valley appeal (R. 156). 
On May 22, 1997, Judge Reese denied a motion to dismiss this case after indicating 
that the case was not yet his, but that he had agreed to hear Norris' motion to dismiss it, 
before there was an initial appearance on the case (R. 1861 at 2, 32). Judge Reese ruled that 
if Judge Dever ruled that case number 971005698 was dismissed without prejudice, the new 
case, 971008355, should be assigned to Judge Dever under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 
(Utah 1986) (R. 1861 at 30-31). 
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On June 30, 1997, this Court recalled the remittitur, upon the Utah Supreme Court's 
order dated June 26, 1997 (R 211) 
On October 29, 1997, this Court stayed the issuance of the remittitur pending 
disposition of Norns's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (R 
214) 
On November 19, 1997, Judge Dever refused to rule on a motion to dismiss with 
prejudice, and stayed the proceedings pending completion of the appellate proceedings, 
because until the remittitur issued from the appellate court, he could not act in the trial court 
(R 166, R 1864 at 4) 
This Court issued the remittitur on October 30, 1998, upon the denial of Norris' 
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (R 124-125) 
At a hearing on December 4, 1998, Judge Dever rejected the argument that the case 
should be viewed as having been filed after the remittitur issued, ruled that the case was filed 
in May of 1997, and that there was nothing to prohibit the prosecutors from refiling before 
the remittitur issued (R 777, 779) Judge Dever also rejected the argument that he should 
dismiss the case with prejudice as a result of Judge Hilder's order expunging the underlying 
records (R 773) 
Judge Dever also demed the challenge to the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute, ruling that the statute required separate charges for each communication, to be 
classified individually on the basis of the aggregated values of all communications m the 
7 
scheme (R. 773-776). 
At the preliminary hearing on February 26, 1999, the State moved to dismiss eight of 
the counts because some of the witnesses were not present (R. 146; R. 1866 at 176-77). 
The prosecution called eight witnesses in support of the twelve remaining counts.2 
2The State's theory of its case at the preliminary hearing was unclear. In some 
instances it seemed to be that Norris was associated with a business named Laroe 
International, which hired the alleged victims under pretenses, promulgated in newspaper 
advertisements and sometimes by Norris personally, that their job descriptions were 
markedly different than the job descriptions contained in various written agreements 
which the alleged victims signed. Norris later sued the alleged victims for breaching the 
written agreements. See, e.g.. State's Exhibits 2, 3, 6, Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3 
(examples of the agreements); R. 1866 at 8-19 (testimony of Joan Mattson). 
In other instances, however, the State's theory seemed to be that Norris failed to 
fulfill the terms of the written agreements or oral understandings regarding the alleged 
victims' terms of employment. See, e.g., R. 1867 at 182-208. 
At the preliminary hearing, Joan Mattson testified that she saw an advertisement 
on May 20, 1993, in the Ogden Standard Examiner, and attended an interview which led 
her to believe that she could earn a salary and benefits selling a diet product for Laroe 
International, and that she was responsible for, but not the purchaser of, the diet product 
(R. 1866 at 8-11, 13-14, 32). The job in fact was not a salaried sales position, but was a 
multi-level position requiring her to recruit sales people, and the Product Installment 
Agreement she signed characterized her as an independent contractor who had purchased 
the diet product from Laroe (R. 1866 at 13-14, 19, 32). Mattson decided not to take the 
job, did not make any sales presentations and was not paid (R. 1866 at 18). She conceded 
that Norris complied with the product return agreement (R. 1866 at 45). Norris later 
sued her for $1,200 under the Product Installment Agreement (R. 1866 at 19). 
Michael Mabry answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune to be a sales 
manager for a $1,400 a month salary (R. 1866 at 94-95). He met personally with Norris 
and did not realize he was committing to being an independent contractor who had 
purchased the diet product, and later learned that Norris would not pay the advertised 
salary (R. 1866 at 100, 110). He initially testified that he worked for two weeks, but then 
testified that he did nothing after the first week because he felt the company was a fraud 
(R. 1866 at 99). Norris later sued him for approximately $1200 (R. 1866 at 100, 113). 
Kay Lemmon saw an advertisement on April 4, 1993 for a diet counselor position 
paying $1,400 salary plus benefits and met twice with Norris (R. 1866 at 115-16). She 
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believed she was responsible for the product she was to distribute, but did not understand 
that she would owe Norris for the product she did not sell (R. 1866 at 126). She claimed 
she was unaware that the employment agreement required her to meet a quota of one 
hundred and twenty-nine sales presentations a month (R. 1866 at 132). She quit going to 
work after about two weeks (R. 1866 at 133). After reading the Product Installment 
Agreement, she repeatedly told Norris that she did not have any money to put down on 
the diet product, but he told her not to worry, and that they would just keep an inventory 
on it (R. 1866 at 117). She tried to return the product and he refused to take it, and later 
sued her for $1964 (R. 1866 at 119). 
Chris Atkins answered an advertisement for employment as some type of sports 
counselor in late May of 1993 (R. 1866 at 138). He came to a group meeting, had an 
individual interview, and then a training meeting when he received an inventory of the 
product (R. 1866 at 140). He signed a product installment agreement, after Norris told 
him it was a substitute for an inventory form that Norris had run out of at the time (R. 
1866 at 151). Atkins knew he would have to pay the company if he sold any diet product, 
but thought he could return the unsold bottles (R. 1866 at 153). When he demanded 
payment of his salary, Norris informed him he would be paid by commission, not salary, 
but then never paid him (R. 1866 at 146). He tried to return the product, but Norris would 
not take it, and later sued him for about $2,000 (R. 1866 at 142). 
Susan Hunter saw an ad in a Utah County journal for work with nutritional 
supplements, paying between $800 and $1,200, depending on the number of hours 
worked (R. 1866 at 158-59, 166). She went to a group meeting, and was hired to service 
established accounts (R. 1866 at 160-61). She attended training meetings for two weeks, 
but after leaving to attend to her family, was never able to contact Norris to begin 
working (R. 1866 at 161-62). She signed a sheet regarding the product, but thought it 
was just for inventory, and did not understand that she was supposed to sell the product 
(R. 1866 at 163). Norris later sued her for around $2,700 (R. 1866 at 164). 
Joy Slotsve answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune in May of 1993 
advertising a diet consultant position paying a salary of $1400 a month (R. 1867 at 182). 
She met personally with Norris, and someone called her back and she was hired (R. 1867 
at 184-85). She believed she would be paid the salary to sell the product (R. 1867 at 185). 
She made sales presentations, but was never paid (R. 1867 at 186). She was required to 
buy the product as part of her job, and when she tried to return it within the fifteen days 
under the contract, Norris refused it (R. 1867 at 186-87). She believed she could return 
unopened individual containers, but he would not accept open boxes of sealed individual 
containers (R. 1867 at 196). She gave him a check for the portion of the product that was 
used, but he refused to cash it and sued her for the full amount (R. 1867 at 188). He sued 
her for $2,700, and then sued her for $30,000 for "turning people against him." (R. 1867 
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Judge Palmer bound over on the twelve counts (R. 1868 at 37). 
After the evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing, trial counsel for Norris 
argued, inter alia, that the information in the last case, number 971008355, should be viewed 
as having been filed when the remittitur issued in October of 1998, and argued that the 
statute of limitations had run (R. 1867 at 210-213). Trial counsel argued that a case could 
not be pending simultaneously in two courts by virtue of due process of law (R. 1868 at 9, 
14). 
Judge Palmer ruled that the date of filing was May 15, 1997 (R. 1868 at 22). He 
at 189, 207-08). 
Kaylynn Crosby Blackham worked as a secretary to Norris, and testified that he 
would not let salespeople return the product unless it was unopened and they met with 
him (T. 57-60). She quit her job because she could not stop people from returning the 
product, because Norris would not make appointments for them to return the product, and 
because Norris yelled at her because she let them return it (R. 1866 at 64). 
Karen Noland testified that she was a secretary for Norris in businesses other than 
Laroe International (R. 1866 at 72-73). Norris repeatedly said that the company could not 
afford to pay the $1,400, but since no one would make the sales quota in their contract, 
they would not have to pay (R. 1866 at 76-77). He planned to make money off the 
salespeople, who had agreed to buy the product, and could not sell their quota (R. 1866 at 
78). 
She testified that he was going to arrange a similar business in Pennsylvania, 
because he could obtain default judgments against people by putting certain language in 
the contracts (R. 1866 at 79-80). He had her put together magazines to support his claims 
in a different advertising business that he had completed advertisements, when in fact he 
had not (R. 1866 at 92). 
She quit after Norris called her from Las Vegas and told her that there was a 
warrant out for him over the Laroe cases, and he did not want to go to jail (R. 1866 at 88). 
He did not want her telling the police anything about what went on in the office (R. 1866 
at 89). He told her that if the police came in, she should hit two keys on the computer to 
destroy records of old clients so the police could not contact them (R. 1866 at 90-91). 
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found that Norris could not benefit from his own delays, which tolled the statute of 
limitations, and that he was not put in jeopardy twice (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-233). He ruled 
that the charges were timely under the statute of limitations (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-233). 
Trial counsel for Norris objected to the order (R. 235-36). 
The State filed an amended information charging eleven counts, again relying on the 
expunged police report (R. 218-223). 
Trial counsel for Norris moved to strike all records which were ordered expunged by 
Judge Hilder, noting that the State had violated Judge Hilder' s expungement order by relying 
on the expunged records to charge Norris, and arguing that the State should not be permitted 
to utilize the expunged records against him (R. 273-282; R. 1873 at 71). 
While the prosecutor, Ernie Jones, had earlier argued at the December 4,1998 hearing 
before Judge Dever that the State opted not to fight Norris' expungement petition when he 
filed it because the prosecution did not believe that the expungement would prevent them 
from refiling (R. 766), in the October 21, 1999 hearing before Judge Reese, the same 
prosecutor then told Judge Reese that he "never never" received the expungement petition 
until after the fact, and that if the prosecution had received notice that he was trying to 
expunge his records, they "would have been in there objecting." (R. 1873 at 78; R. 131). 
Judge Reese ruled that it was permissible for the police to rely on the original 
investigative material in refiling the case after the expungement, and that the State could rely 
on the evidence at the trial (R. 1873 at 80-81). 
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On October 29, 1999, trial counsel for Norris moved for a bill of particulars (R. 328-
333). 
Judge Reese denied Norris' motion to dismiss, ruling that the prosecution's charges 
were timely filed, and were properly filed while the West Valley case was on appeal (R. 1873 
at 69-70). 
On November 17, 1999, Norris entered guilty pleas to two third degree felony counts 
of communications fraud (R. 1273). 
Judge Reese sentenced Norris to two consecutive terms of zero to five years on 
January 3, 2000 (R. 1481-1488). 
On July 27,2000, Judge Reese denied Norris' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 
1538-39). 
On September 26, 2002, this Court published an opinion reversing this ruling and 
ordering the trial court to permit with withdrawal of the guilty pleas (1578-84). See, State 
v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, 57 P.3d 238. 
Norris moved to dismiss for vindictive prosecution (R. 1643-46). 
Norris again moved for a bill of particulars, noting the history of vagueness of the 
charges against Norris, and asking the government to specify the scheme or artifice to 
defraud, the value, the communications, and the mens rea (R. 1649-51). 
On September 8,2003, Mr. Norris pled no contest to two class A misdemeanor counts 
of attempted communications fraud, reserving his right to appeal the issues of the 
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constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, and district court jurisdiction (R. 1814-
1822). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should strike the communications fraud statute because it is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The plain terms of the statute criminalize a vast 
array of constitutionally protected speech, and permit a constitutionally excessive amount of 
prosecutorial discretion. The vagueness of the statute has aheady resulted in a number of 
significantly different interpretations and applications of the statute in this case and in many 
others. 
Alternatively, this Court should order the lower court to permit the withdrawal of 
Norris' pleas, and to dismiss the case, because the trial court never properly obtained subject 
matter jurisdiction over Norris' case. Because the case was pending in the appellate courts 
and remittitur had not issued from this Court when the prosecution refiled the information, 
the filing of the information was void. Because the prosecutors abused their power to refile 
the case to harass Norris, and because they vindictively increased the four misdemeanor 
charges to twenty felony counts, and radically increased the bail from the original $2,000, 
to $150,000, to punish Norris' asserting his rights in the appeal and Norris' pursuit of 
dismissal of the refiled counts, the prosecutors violated due process of law and defeated the 
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
13 
Individually, and certainly cumulatively,3 the errors undermining Norris' charges and 
convictions warrant reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD.4 
A. THE LEGISLATURE MUST DEFINE CRIMES, PARTICULARLY WHEN 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS INVOLVED. 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees due process of law, as does the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Doctrines of procedural and 
substantive due process call for legislation that is sufficiently specific to give notice of 
proscribed behavior. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987); In re Bover, 636 
P.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Utah 1981). 
The vagueness doctrine is designed to insure that citizens have notice of the legal 
consequences of their actions, and to insure that legislative policy determinations are not 
delegated to those who are to enforce and apply the laws. See, Grayned v. Rockford, 408 
3Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court should consider all errors, both 
identified and assumed by the Court to have occurred, and reverse if "'the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
4The constitutionality and interpretation of the communications fraud statute is also 
at issue in other cases presently pending before this Court - State v. Norris, Case No. 
20020966-CA and State v. Bradshaw. Case No. 20020137-CA. Variants of some of the 
arguments in this brief originated in the briefs in those cases, written by Jennifer Gowans 
and Kent Hart, respectively. 
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U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 
The vagueness doctrine is particularly focused on legislative failure to define criminal 
standards, because our nation values the freedom of our citizens, and seeks to prevent 
executive and judicial branch actors from having excessive discretion to discriminate in the 
enforcement and application of the laws. Kolender v Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). 
In addition to the general due process guarantees mentioned above, the Utah 
Constitution requires the legislature to define the criminal law, vesting the lawmaking power 
in the legislative branch of our state government. See Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1. 
Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution mandates separation of government 
powers. This constitutional provision recognizes the critical balance of the branches of our 
government, which requires the legislature to write specific laws, rather than enacting vague 
laws explicitly or implicitly delegating to police, prosecutors and judges the responsibility 
to define the law. See State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App.)(statute explicitly delegating 
to U.S. Attorney authority to define elements and punishment of crimes under controlled 
substances act violated non-delegation doctrine of Article VI section 1 of Utah Constitution), 
cert, denied. 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 1990); State v. Galliot 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977)(statute explicitly delegating to Utah Attorney General authority to define elements and 
punishment of crimes under controlled substances act violated Article V, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution). See also State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J., 
concurring)(,f,It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough 
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to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to courts to step inside and say who could be 
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute 
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.M,)(citation omitted). 
Courts must strictly scrutinize for vagueness criminal statutes such as the 
communications fraud statute, which may impinge upon First Amendment rights, to insure 
that the laws are drafted with "narrow specificity" so that such rights have adequate 
"breathing space." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
B. THE LEGISLATURE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD. 
The communications fraud statute, § 76-10-1801, currently provides, 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme 
or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of something of 
monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
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shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited 
to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, 
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. 
The 1990 version of the statute which should have applied to Norris' 1993 offenses 
was the same as the current version, but differed on the classification values.5 
5Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990) differed only in subsection (1), which then 
provided, 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice 
is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
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The term "artifice" is not defined by law, but is commonly defined as "false or 
insincere behavior" or a "trick," - terms that can be used to describe any form of dishonesty. 
See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (19831 at page 106. 
The word "communicate" is also given the broadest possible definition under the 
statute, and subsection (1) of the statute purports to penalize communication "with any 
person," without regard to whether one widely published utterance by a defendant might 
reach multiple persons and arguably sustain multiple charges, regardless of whether anyone 
relied on the utterance. 
The phrase "anything of value" is not defined and its application is therefore left to 
the eye of the beholder for definition. 
The plain language of the statute provides that it is a crime to devise a scheme or 
artifice to defraud or to obtain anything of value by means of false pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and to communicate directly or indirectly with any person 
by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice. Because of 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed 
$10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed 
$100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
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this disjunctive language, there need be no intent to defraud; a desire to obtain something of 
value satisfies the statute.6 
The following discussion demonstrates that the language of the communications fraud 
statute gives rise to multiple interpretations and applications, in violation of the vagueness 
doctrine, discussed above. The differing interpretations give rise to various additional 
constitution problems, discussed below. 
1. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND CONSTITUTIONAL OVERBREADTH 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to 
freedom of speech and the press. 
Article I § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Consistent with standard English language usage, Utah courts recognize that when 
statutes or rules are phrased in the disjunctive, this requires the selection of only one of 
the provisions selection of only one of the provisions joined by the word "or." See, e.g., 
State v. Walker, 649 P. 2d 16, 17 (Utah 1982)(in finding that incorrect jury instruction was 
actually to the defendant's benefit, the court recognized that the statute at issue, § 76-6-
404 "requires finding only one of two disjunctives"); In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 215 
(Utah 1997)(rule governing disbarment is phrased in the disjunctive, and thus requires 
only one of several findings listed); Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company 
of St. Paul Minnesota, 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1986)(in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 
31-18-8, the court recognized that "[t]he statutory alternatives are stated in the 
disjunctive, not the conjunctive[,]" and concluded that to prevail under that statute, a 
party needed proof of only one of the alternatives listed). 
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(Emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the emphasized portion of that provision 
"[o]n its face ... protects one's constitutional right to express one's opinion, limited only by 
the responsibility for the 'abuse' ofthatright." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 
1015 (Utah 1994). 
Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in relevant part, "No law shall be 
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." This provision is to be 
read in conjunction with Article I § 1, supra, and is deemed "more definitive and inclusive 
than the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution]." West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1017 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
The Utah Constitution "reflects the positive attitude of the constitution's drafters 
toward a free and uninhibited press." West at 1014. 
"'Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful 
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even 
if they also have legitimate application.'" I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT llOat^f 15,61 P.3d 1038 
(citation omitted). 
"In considering whether a statute suffers from overbreadth ca court's first task is to 
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct.'" I.M.L. v. State, at \ 15 (citation omitted). 
"A statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if it 'does not aim specifically at 
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evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit 
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or 
the press/" Provo City v. Whatcott 2000UTApp86,1J8,1 P.3d 1113 (UtahCt App. 2000). 
Language which is strictly opinion is protected by the Utah Constitution. West 872 
P.2d at 1015.7 "'An obvious potential for quashing or muting [free speech] looms large when 
[fact finders] attempt to assess the truth of a statement that admits of no method of 
verification/" Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the West court). "c[I]t is well understood 
that editorial writers and commentators frequently resort to the type of caustic bombast 
traditionally used in editorial writing to stimulate public reaction.'" Id. at 1020 (citation 
omitted; brackets by the West court). 
The communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad, because the statute 
is not limited to any discrete area of legitimate state control, and does not distinguish between 
fact and opinion, and thus portends to punish significant amounts of constitutionally 
protected speech. But see, e j ^ West supra. 
For instance, newspaper columnists Marianne Jennings and Molly Ivins routinely and 
Constitutionally protected opinions are distinguished from actionable fact-bound 
statements by analysis of four factors: 
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the 
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the 
full context of the statement-for example, the entire article or column--in 
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in 
which the statement appears. 
West at 1018. 
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intentionally makes bold sarcastic false statements of opinion, as part of their schemes to 
obtain something of value - improvements in human behavior and national politics, or sales 
of their columns. Because the statute imposes criminal liability for obtaining anything of 
value by means of false representations, and does not require proof of intent to defraud, the 
columnists' constitutionally-protected political opinions could be prosecuted as second 
degree felony counts of communications fraud. Cf. West supra. 
"Puffing" and political commentary are constitutionally protected forms of 
communication under both article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution and the First 
Amendment of the federal Constitution. See, e.g.. West supra. Political candidates and 
elected government officials often make inaccurate statements or omit material facts with a 
reckless disregard for the truth, in pursuit of elections, in justifying wars, or in accomplishing 
any number of other political agendas. Advertisers often communicate inaccurate assertions 
about their products with a reckless disregard for the truth, in an effort to achieve sales. 
Under the language of the communications fraud statute, the political and commercial 
communicators are ostensibly subject to criminal liability. Compare Provo City v. Whatcott 
2000 UT App 86,1 P.3d 1113 (striking telephone harassment statute on overbreadth grounds, 
because statute criminalized telephone calls involving lewd or lascivious language, or made 
with the "intent to annoy, alarm another, threaten, harass, or frighten any person ... or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof"). 
Most false or misleading communications are made to obtain something of value to 
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the person who utters them. False communications inherently involve a scheme or artifice, 
because "artifice" is not specifically defined in the Utah Code, but is commonly defined in 
broad terms such as "false or insincere behavior", "an artful stratagem" or "trick." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (19831 at page 106. Under this broad definition, 
an artifice always underlies any dishonest communication. 
Because criminal liability may be imposed when the object of dishonest behavior is 
"anything of value," and because intent to defraud is not an essential element, the 
applicability of the second degree felony variant of the statute applies to a virtually limitless 
array of dishonest statements or behaviors or omissions. 
For instance, a woman might lie about her weight in an effort to curry favor with her 
thin friends and to shield herself from embarrassment. Or a man might tell a woman that he 
is a Democrat to get a date with her, when he is in fact a Republican. In these scenarios, the 
offenders have devised a scheme or artifice to obtain something of value, have 
communicated for the purpose of executing the scheme, and ostensibly could be prosecuted 
as second degree felons. 
While the ordinary person would not expect such common falsehoods to result in 
second degree felony criminal liability, the plain and exceedingly broad language of the 
communications fraud statute grants prosecutors the discretion to prosecute virtually any 
dishonesty whatsoever as a second degree felony. But see. State v. Blowers, 717 P,2d 1321, 
1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J., concurring)('nIt would certainly be dangerous if the legislature 
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could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to courts to step 
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, 
to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the 
government.,f,)(citation omitted). 
Because second degree felony liability follows from any false communication, 
behavior, or material omission designed to garner "anything of value," the statute sweeps 
well beyond any legitimate area of governmental control, and into the realm of free speech 
and expression. Compare Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 (striking 
telephone harassment statute on overbreadth grounds, because statute criminalized telephone 
calls involving lewd or lascivious language, or made with the "intent to annoy, alarm another, 
threaten, harass, or frighten any person ... or recklessly creating a risk thereof"). 
Because there is no way to construe the communications fraud statute as 
constitutional, short of rewriting it or ignoring its plain meaning, the Court should hold the 
statute facially invalid regardless of any legitimate application it may have. See, Provo City 
v. WilldeiL 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). 
A judicial attempt to rewrite the law would violate the separation of powers doctrine 
of the State Constitution, and constitute an invasion of the legislative province of lawmaking. 
See, e.g., Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah App.) (M[S]ince it is the 
judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the law as 
it sees fit, such arguments are better saved for the legislature."), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 
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(Utah 1993). 
2. EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS 
The communications fraud statute grants prosecutors discretion to charge each 
communication once regardless of the number of recipients, to charge separately each 
communication to "any person" who receives the communication, to aggregate all 
communications into a single charge that encompasses an overall "scheme or fraud," to 
charge multiple serious offenses on the basis of aggregated damages, or to charge offenses 
on the basis of the value of each separate offense. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), 
(2), and (5), 
Despite numerous motions for a bill of particulars (R. 328-333; 1649-51), the State 
never specified which communications form the basis of any of the various counts charged 
against Norris, what Norris' scheme or artifice was, whatNorris' mens rea was, or the factual 
basis for the values classifying the third degree felony charges. But see, e.g., Constitution 
of Utah Article I ^ [12 (accused has the right to demand to know the "nature and cause of the 
accusation against him"); Utah R. Crim P. 4 (entitling defendant to bill of particulars if 
necessary to give defendant sufficient notice of offense charged). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 
9 (b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity.").8 
In Norris' case, the statute was interpreted and applied in several disparate ways. The 
8The civil rules generally apply in criminal cases when the criminal rules do not 
provide guidance. See Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). 
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prosecution's theory underlying two counts for each victim in this case was apparently that 
Norris communicated to each of them twice - once through a newspaper advertisement, and 
once in personal meetings (R. 9-10; R. 1867at221). The evidence at the preliminary hearing 
arguably involved many more communications, because Norris had ongoing employment 
relationships with many of the victims. See n.2, supra (summarizing preliminary hearing). 
It was not clear from the preliminary hearing that all of the victims saw separate newspaper 
advertisements, see id., and it appears that one newspaper advertisement or other 
communication might be viewed as justifying a separate charge for each person who received 
the communication (R. 9-10). 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor argued that the value of the counts could 
be determined on the basis of the $1,400 job offer Norris advertised in the newspaper, or on 
the basis of the lawsuits he subsequently filed against people, seeking over a thousand dollars 
in each suit (R. 1868 at 31-32). He argued that he could have charged a separate count for 
each communication received by each victim, including counts for each victim who read a 
newspaper article, and for each victim who heard Norris speak in a group meeting (R. 1868 
at 34). 
In binding over on the twelve counts, Judge Palmer reasoned that Norris misled the 
victims with the advertisement that they would be paid $1,400 plus benefits, and in 
subsequent meetings, when he led them believe that they would be salaried employees, when 
the contracts he had them sign immediately actually reflected that they would be independent 
contractors (R. 1868 at 35). He approved of the third degree felony classification of the 
charges on the basis that each communication involved a $1,400 misrepresentation, rather 
than on the basis of the amount Norris sought to obtain through the scheme (the damages 
sought in his lawsuits against the victims), either through each separate lawsuit, or in the 
aggregate of all the suits involved in the scheme (R. 1868 at 37). 
Judge Watson originally dismissed the case out of circuit court on the theory that the 
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aggregated damages of the four original $300 counts elevated the misdemeanor charges 
originally filed to the felony level. See Statement of Facts, supra (R. 32,36-37,290,624-27, 
682-684, 698), and Judge Dever's ruling on the constitutionality of the statute interpreted it 
as requiring each separate communication to be classified on the basis of the aggregated 
values of all offenses (R. 773-776). 
In district court, however, the prosecution apparently classified the offenses as third 
degree felonies on the basis of non-aggregated damages, because if the values had been 
combined for all counts, the charges should have been second degree felonies. See, e.g., 76-
10-1801(l)(d) (1990) (classifying offense as second degree felony if the value is between 
$10,000 and $100,000). 
A review of the facts patterns of numerous Utah communications fraud cases confirms 
that the uncertain terms of the communications fraud statute leaves prosecutors with virtually 
unbridled discretion in all cases, and leaves citizens unable to predict the serious 
consequences of their actions. 
For instance, in State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 425, 2003 WL 22922435 (unpublished 
opinion), this Court affirmed one conviction for communications fraud, which was supported 
by evidence that the defendant "spoke with the victim five or six times by telephone 
concerning payments on the investment." Had he or she been so inclined, the Smith 
prosecutor could easily have charged five or six counts on the basis of the five or six 
telephone calls. 
In contrast, in State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 87, ffif 5-23 and 30-41, 76 P.3d 1173, 
cert, denied, 84 P.3d 249 (Utah 2003), this Court affirmed multiple convictions for 
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communications fraud against a car salesman, which were each apparently premised on 
purchases or sales of specific cars, many of which individual transactions involved multiple 
communications, and some of which involved more than one victim. Additionally, in some 
instances, there were two convictions for the purchase and sale of one vehicle. Id. Rather 
than basing the charges on car transactions, the same prosecutor might well have chosen to 
charge only one count of communications fraud, as the Smith prosecutor did, or could also 
have charged several more counts on the basis of the number of communications and 
communication recipients involved. 
In State v. Stringhanu 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153, this Court affirmed five 
convictions for communications fraud, finding that they were supported by evidence that the 
defendant organized, controlled, and knew the billing practices of a company, and instructed 
an employee to use a doctor's signature stamp on insurance forms, despite the fact that this 
doctor did not truly perform any services on the patients. The same prosecutor might have 
charged only one count of communications fraud, on the basis of the scheme to defraud, as 
the Smith prosecutor did, or could have charged more counts on the basis of the number of 
communications and communication recipients involved. 
In contrast, in State v. Silva. 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604, a defendant was 
convicted of one count of communications fraud as a result of eight phone calls he made in 
an effort to trick one person into paying his bail. This prosecutor might have charged eight 
second degree felony counts on the basis of the communications fraud statutory directive that 
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each communication is to constitute a separate offense. 
In State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997), this Court affirmed one second 
degree felony conviction for communications fraud, which was premised on evidence that 
the defendant had someone cash between thirty-five and forty checks worth $300 each, or 
a worth a total of at least $ 10,500. On these facts, a different prosecutor could have charged 
between thirty-five and forty second degree felony charges, or several more, depending on 
how many people received the communications in the forged checks. 
The varied interpretations and applications of the vague terms of the communications 
fraud statute by the judges and prosecutors in this case, and by the Utah prosecutors in the 
other cases discussed, supra, confirm the importance of the law, discussed above, requiring 
the legislature to clearly define crimes, so that those enforcing the laws are not left with 
excessive discretion. See, e.g.. Blowers, supra. : 
When laws are as poorly drafted as the communications fraud statute is, constitutional 
rights to equal protection and uniform operation of laws are jeopardized. See, e.g.. Wood v. 
University of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436, 449 2002 UT 134, ffi[ 33-34 (Utah 
2002)(recognizing that state constitution requires that all laws apply uniformly to similarly 
situated people, and that the federal constitution requires laws to apply in similar fashion to 
similarly situated individuals). 
Because the communications fraud statute impinges on fundamental constitutional 
rights to free speech and expression, this Court should review it with strict scrutiny, to 
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determine whether the classifications in the law further a compelling state interest. See, e.g., 
StateinreN.R.. 967 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah App. 1998). 
Review of the permutations of the statute applied at various times in Mr. Norris' case, 
and in the Utah communications fraud cases discussed above, demonstrates that the 
classifications in the statute do not survive strict scrutiny, or even review for rationality, 
because the terms of the statute classify between those who will face minor and major 
charges, and between one or many charges, without any clear legislative guidance or 
rationale. 
Reference to State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995), confirms that the 
prosecutors should not have such discretion, by virtue of the uniform operation of laws 
provision, Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution. In striking the juvenile direct filing 
provision in Mohi, the Court described the unique application of the state constitutional 
provision, stating, "[F]or a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that 
it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law 
does not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly situated1 are not 'treated similarly.'" Id. at 
997 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, some brackets by the Court). 
Courts applying the uniform operation of laws provision are to identify statutory 
classifications, determine whether classes of people subject to the statute are treated in 
disparate fashion, and then assess whether the disparate treatment is justified by a reasonable 
legislative objective. Id. 
30 
Applying in the context of the communications fraud statute the analysis set forth in 
Mohi confirms that the statute violate the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Because Utah prosecutors have discretion to either charge each communication 
separately, to charge each reception of a fraudulent representation separately, to aggregate 
all communications into a single charge that targets an overall "scheme or fraud," and/or to 
charge multiple maximum level offenses for each communication based on aggregated 
damages, similarly situated communications fraud offenders may well be classified and 
treated in wildly disparate fashions, without any legislative consideration of or justification 
for the disparity. Compare the facts of this case, with those in Smith, Nichols, Stringham, 
Silva, and Ross, supra. 
While there might be a legitimate need to prosecute some offenders more harshly than 
others, the statutory scheme does not specify in any way how prosecutors are to select which 
defendants are prosecuted under any particular theory or interpretation of the statute. Cf. 
Mohi at 1002 (excessive prosecutorial discretion permits prosecutors to discriminate against 
unpopular groups of people). 
The prosecutorial discretion available under the varied interpretations of the ill-
defined communications fraud statute permits and risks prosecutorial arbitrariness 
discrimination, forbidden under federal constitutional law as well. See, Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (prosecutions may not be based on arbitrary classification, 
or other unjustifiable standards such as race or religion). The Utah legislature's enactment 
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of the vague communications fraud statute does not constitute "constitutionally valid 
definition of offenses," but risks and facilitates a prosecution guided by arbitrary and 
unjustifiable standards. But see Bordenkircher. 
3. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL AND UNDULY RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT 
Under subsections 2 and 5 of the communications fraud statute, the statute could be 
interpreted as authorizing prosecutors to charge multiple counts of the highest degree 
possible for each separate communication on the basis of the aggregate value of the 
combined counts. 
Also, because communication is defined so broadly, the statute may be interpreted as 
permitting a separate charge for each person who receives a communication, regardless of 
whether the defendant succeeded in defrauding any of the recipients. See § 76-10-1801 (1) 
("Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme or artifice is guilty[.]") (Emphasis added). 
These interpretations of the language of the communications fraud statute pose 
significant constitutional problems. 
Aggregation statutes, such as the one at issue here, are normally designed to allow 
prosecutors to treat defendants who defraud several persons of small amounts of money like 
offenders who have taken a higher amount of money. See, State v. Joles, 492 So. 2d 490, 
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494 (La. 19861 cert, denied 479 U.S. 1056(1987). The theory behind such provisions is that 
defendants who take a little money from several people are as culpable as those who take a 
lot of money from one person. Id. Thus, aggregation provisions allow prosecutors to treat 
a person who takes $50 from ten people the same as a person who takes $500 from one 
person. Id 
But allowing the State to treat multiple misdemeanor counts of fraud the same as 
multiple second degree felonies, or to treat one utterance by a defendant as multiple counts 
of fraud on the basis of the number of recipients, would drastically and unjustly increase 
punishment for communications fraud. Rather than aggregating several minor offenses to 
place them on par with one large one, this interpretation of the communication fraud statute 
places a minor offender of one or of several minor acts in the same position as a major 
offender of multiple large crimes. 
This interpretation of the statute runs counter to the portions of the communications 
fraud statute which explicitly punish offenders differently depending upon the amount of 
money sought to be taken. 
Permitting each communication to be counted on the basis of the number of recipients, 
and/or punished separately and classified more severely on the basis of the aggregate value 
of all objects of communications would run counter to fundamental constitutional law 
banning cruel and unusual punishments. Criminal punishments must be proportionate to the 
offenses, to comport with the Eighth Amendment and Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution. 
In assessing sentences for compliance with the Eighth Amendment, the courts assesses 
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whether a punishment is "excessive or contravene[] evolving standards of decency and 
human dignity," State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64 at 1f 46, 993 P.2d 854, 866-67 or if it is 
"barbaric, excessive or disproportional to the offense committed." State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 
1372, 1377 (Utah 1996). 
Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and 
unnecessarily rigorous treatment of inmates, has broader language than the Eighth 
Amendment, and has been interpreted as requiring inquiry into the specific facts and 
circumstances of each case. See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986). 
As the supreme court recently noted in State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19; 20 P.3d 342, 
cert, denied. 534 U.S. 1018 (2001), 
A criminal punishment is cruel and unusual under article I, section 9 if it is "so 
disproportionate to the offense committed that it 'shocks the moral sense of all 
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.'" 
2001 UT l9,1fl[73;20P.3d365. 
Clearly, if a petty offender may be punished multiple times for each separate offense, 
or be punished multiple times on the basis of one act of uttering a fraudulent statement 
received by many, and may be punished each individual time for aggregated damages, this 
could readily result in a sentence so disproportionate as to violate the State and federal 
constitutions. See, Lafferty, Herrera, supra. 
4. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The ambiguity of the communications fraud statute risks violating defendants' right 
to be free from multiple prosecutions for the same offense, protected by the Fifth 
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Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Under these constitutional provisions, criminal defendants have the fundamental right 
to be free from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense following acquittal; (2) a 
second prosecution for the same offense following a conviction; and, (3) multiple 
punishments for the same offense. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). 
Charging defendants with multiple counts under the same statute implicates the last 
of these protections. State v. Turner, 6 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). Courts 
assessing such charges for compliance with the law of double jeopardy assess whether the 
"unit of prosecution" is clearly defined by the legislature. Id.; State v. Adel, 965 P. 2d 1072, 
1074 (Wash. 1998). While legislatures can define crimes and punishments (as long as the 
laws are not cruel and unusual or unduly rigorous), "double jeopardy protects a defendant 
from being convicted twice under the same statute for committing just one unit of the crime." 
Ii 
The communications fraud statute fails to clearly define the unit of prosecution. 
The statute does not specify whether the State can charge multiple small offenses as multiple 
large offenses, or can elevate the level of each charge with the amount sought to be obtained 
from all communications made as part of a scheme, or whether one communication is one 
offense, or whether one communication received by many recipients is many offenses. 
Under some ostensibly legitimate interpretations of the language of the 
communications fraud statute, the vagueness of the statute thus risks violation of the law of 
double jeopardy. See, e.g., Adel supra. 
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While federal law encourages trial courts to construe statutes with lenity in such 
circumstances, see, id, under the unique separation of powers provision of the Utah 
Constitution, this Court should refrain from effectively rewriting the legislature's poorly 
drafted law. See, e ^ , Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah App.) ("[S]ince 
it is the judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the 
law as it sees fit, such arguments are better saved for the legislature.M), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 
1356 (Utah 1993). 
Because the communications fraud statute prohibits constitutionally protected speech, 
because persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's meaning and 
differ as to its application, because prosecutors have excessive discretion to charge similarly 
situated offenders in disparate fashion, because some interpretations of the statute risk 
violations of the law against cruel, unusual and unduly rigorous punishment and against 
double jeopardy, this Court should strike the statute on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., 
Hoffman; West supra. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION 
OVER NORRIS'CASE. 
A. THERE WAS NO JURISDICTION IN THE LOWER COURT WHILE THE CASE 
WAS PENDING IN THE APPELLATE COURTS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 (2003) provides, "No person shall be punished for a public 
offense until convicted in a court having jurisdiction." 
As is detailed in the Statement of Facts, supra, the information in the instant case was 
filed before the remittitur issued from the appeals stemming from the original misdemeanor 
case prosecuted by West Valley City in the name of the State. 
The scheme and victims alleged in the three cases filed after the original West Valley 
case were the same as those involved in the West Valley case, and four of the State's final 
victims were the original victims in West Valley's state case (e.g. R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13, 
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20). 
Particularly where the classification of each offense was at times determined by the 
judges on the basis of the aggregate damages in the overall scheme, and particularly where 
the successive informations were all based on the same original police report (9,53, 59,218-
223), the charges should all have been brought together before one court by one prosecutorial 
entity. See, e ^ Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) (2003) (multiple offenses within the 
jurisdiction of one court, and known to the prosecutor at the time of the arraignment, should 
be tried together); Utah R. Crim P. 9.5 (all offenses arising out of a single criminal episode 
should be prosecuted before one court by one prosecutorial entity). Compare, e.g.. State v. 
Mead, 27 P.3d 1115 (Utah 2001) (murder and conspiracy charges were properly charged and 
tried together, despite the fact that the acts underlying the charges occurred weeks apart, 
because they involved the same criminal objective and were thus incident to one single 
criminal episode, and properly joined under 9.5 and 76-1-402). 
By reviewing Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), this Court can confirm that the trial court failed to 
obtain subject matter jurisdiction over this last case filed, because the information which was 
filed before the remittitur issued properly was void and a nullity. 
In Hi-Country, a trial court modified its judgment in accordance with an appellate 
decision from this Court, before the Utah Supreme Court disposed of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari. See id., at 305-06. The court addressed several related jurisdictional issues, 
beginning with the premise that a trial court does not have jurisdiction over a case which is 
pending on appeal. Id. at 306. The court noted that this Court's issuance of the remittitur 
before the certiorari petition was filed did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court, because the 
remittitur was premature and should not have issued until the expiration of time for filing a 
petition for certiorari. Id. The court explained that if proceedings may occur simultaneously 
in different courts in one case, this disserves judicial economy and renders the case a 
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"proverbial'moving target.'" Id. at 307. 
it was entered when the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and was void. Id. 
In the instant matter, West Valley City, acting in the name of the State of Utah, 
Watson dismissed it because he interpreted the communications fraud statute as requiring 
felony charges in this case, which at that time, belonged in district, not circuit court. 
Despite the ongoing proceedings in this Court, and then Utah Supreme Court, and then 
1 Inifnl States ^upiciiii" ( mni in IIIK ^ryeast' llicShli f rfiiMilalh iHiiln) die duiif*^ Ivfoiv 
the remittitur properly issued, and before the lower courts could properly obtain subject 
matter jurisdiction over Mr. Norris. See Hi-Country, supra. 
[)t\ ,iu-. the disti ict :x: . ::L. ..:•. a^.^ c w a;, uaore me appellate 
courts, see, High-Country, the informations filed m \h,--\c , t ^ nullities ;ind See, 
e.g., Transworld Systems Inc. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah 1990) (proceedings 
conducted without jurisdiction are nullities and \oid). 
and the filing of the last case with Judge Reese when case number 971005698 had pending 
a motion to dismiss with prejudice with Judge Dever, also violated the concurrent jurisdiction 
...... i has been recognized ,.. ; ;*.;. I** years. As the court explained in Escalante 
Lu. \ Ivciit "' V "'mi I ' 'in. I hi ,i I in I«M J), 
"Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject, and to test 
the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, 
the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the 
administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of 
the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to 
interfere with its action. This rule rests upon comity and the necessity of 
avoiding conflict in the execution of judgments by independent courts, and is 
a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to perpetual 
collision and be productive of most calamitous results." 
Id. at 278 (citation omitted). 
The convoluted procedural history of this case, and Mr. Norris' experiences in having 
been repeatedly charged, arrested and hailed before so many different courts to answer so 
many different charges and theories premised on the same underlying facts, prove the validity 
of, and the importance of complying with, the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. See id. See, 
also, e.g., Nielsonv. Schiller, 66 P. 2d 365, 366 (Utah 1937) (refiling elements of case in one 
court while other elements are pending in another court of concurrent jurisdiction "is 
abhorrent to the orderly procedure and determination of causes in courts of concurrent 
jurisdiction and cannot do other than inject confusion into the orderly procedure of the 
courts."). 
B. THE MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS VIOLATED NORRIS' RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS. 
Assuming that the pendency of the appellate proceedings did not prevent the 
attachment of subject matter jurisdiction under Hi-Country, supra, but especially because of 
the obvious lack of jurisdiction, the government's overall course of conduct in this case 
should have resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of the ultimate charges. 
The lower courts were clearly in error in failing to recognize their power to stop the 
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prosecutors from refiling this case (e.j^. \< " . k. i s 7 J at 70), because our constitutions 
empower the courts to protect our citizens from such prosecutorial abuses. 
'.i.v. rederal constitution is designed w, p r o k c i i-^.opk Horn "being tv \ue pu; in 
|("o|ui(i«\ Abney \. United States, 4 i 1 U S <tS| do Mi ' I I ^7 n i | I i ulili Unipjhh i asc »„ 
Courts interpreting the constitution recognize that criminal prosecutions cause "personal 
strain, public embarrassment, and expense." Id. Courts recognize that the boundless 
that such repeated attempts may increase "the possibility of an in nocent per son being 
wrongfully convicted. Id. 
Courts have held that due process forbids the government to harass citizens with 
• t*-;si\ "£ 01 siiiiii lltaneoi is pr :>si€ ::i it i i>±x. « •hi icd S t a t e s v. A m e r i c a n H o n d a 
Motor Company, 273 F.Supp. 810 (N.D. 111. 1967); PI I t Inc. v. United States Department 
of Justice, 743 F.Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1990); Freedburg v. United States Department of Justice, 
i U rP ^ 
> vincncaii i tunuii. -i ! *' • Amendment rast1 di iiins;iiiii» 
duplicative indictments for multiple conspiracies arising out of one transaction, due process 
requires fundamental fairness and fair play, and will not permit the government to harass a 
nging multiple chai ges, and requiring the defendant; . i;ii^jk-. in 
different courts. " I h s Go^ ^ernment is ii : t a i ingma ste i foi ( - I: m : ill lit idi * i In tails and 
corporations must j u m p through a hoop at their own expense each time it commands." Id. 
at 819-820 (citations omitted). 
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In State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the 
opinions of numerous courts recognizing the potential for abuse and harassment inherent in 
prosecutorial power to refile cases, stating, "the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection 
for the accused." Id. at 647. The court held that the due process guarantee in Article I § 7 
of the Utah Constitution, and principles of fundamental fairness prohibit prosecutors from 
refiling criminal charges previously dismissed for insufficient evidence at the preliminary 
hearing, absent a showing of new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause. 
See id. at 646-48. The court also established the requirement that when prosecutors do refile 
cases dismissed for insufficient evidence, they must refile them before the original magistrate 
when possible, rather than forum shop. Id. at 647-48. 
In State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, the court expanded on this important 
area of the law, stating that the "lodestar of Brickey... is fundamental fairness," and that due 
process presumptively bars refiling when "potential abusive practices are involved." Id. at 
TIH 15 and 16. 
The court recognized that criminal defendants always experience some level of 
oppression and harassment, and emphasized that courts are compelled to intervene under the 
due process precedents in cases involving "potential bad faith or misconduct of the 
prosecutors." Id. at [^22. 
The Morgan court found that the refiling in that case did not involve bad faith, 
because the prosecutor had innocently miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary to 
obtain a bindover, had not engaged in forum shopping, did not refile to harass the defendant, 
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and did not withhold evidence from the defendant at the first preliminary hearing to tin 
tactical advantage. Id. at 25. 
Iii ::: : iiti ast, the go v ei nment filed and re filed this case against A 11. ,\ 0111:, four separate 
times, beginning with four misdemean • *t • •• • Vi ounojcpo, [,» i(r^> 
the government's appeal from the dismissal of that West Valley City case was pending in one 
form or another in this Coin t, in the Utah Supreme Court, and in the United States Supreme 
Ann. §76-l-302(l)(b) (2002), the government repeatedly charged Norris again, first with 
eleven counts of third degree felony communications fraud, based on the same facts as the 
orign./ Y\ est \ alii:"1 case ... ^ . ^ numoer /"KLUMH) \\\ • % i * . M M . and then with ten 
third degree felon] ' • :oi iiit --l-i "~ •'-•'' 'W N ''- ] ^  ^' " c 
appeal in case number 941004949 was pending, and when case number 971005698 had 
pending a motion to disniiss with prejudice with Judge Dever, the government charged 
t K L . • '! : . . . : . , ; t { i ; , ; t , . ! ' -\»*N ^ 5 , 
doubling the bail (R. 189-199). 
The last two cases and the last three informations (R. 9, 59, 218-223) were all 
explicitly premised on the police report * •) which should have been expunged pursuant 
to Judge Hildf • ; >^ ^^. ^ ^ . . cmMs v. utali State Bd. of Edm i 
811,813 (Utah 1990) (expunged records are to be sealed, and may not be referred to or relied 
on in subsequent proceedings). The prosecution's lack of good faith on this point is 
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illustrated by the prosecutor's inconsistent representations relating to the expungement issue.9 
The third and fourth informations represented that there had been no prior related 
cases (R. 60, 11), when that was certainly not the case. But see, e.g., Brickey, supra 
(requiring prosecutors to refile cases previously dismissed for insufficient evidence with 
same magistrate who entered the dismissal order). 
The prosecutors certainly must have known that the refilings were illegal, because of 
all of the black letter law discussed above in this point of the brief, and because Judge Palmer 
quashed the first refiled charges and ruled that he would not hear the case until the West 
Valley case was completely disposed of (R. 131, 166). 
The prosecution's refiling of the case effectively violated Judge Palmer's ruling, the 
spirit of Brickey, and the law of the case doctrine, which generally prevents "'one district 
court judge [from] overruling] another district court judge of equal authority.'" Red Flame 
Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ffif 4 and 5, 996 P.2d 540. 
After Judge Dever dismissed the second refiled charges and ruled that the State could 
not refile until the remittitur issued (R. 34, 166; R. 1860 at 27), the State then went to Judge 
Reese and refiled not just the ten charges, but twenty, all involving the same victims and 
9As noted above, While the prosecutor, Ernie Jones, had earlier argued at the 
December 4, 1998 hearing before Judge Dever that the State opted not to fight Norris' 
expungement petition when he filed it because the prosecution did not believe that the 
expungement would prevent them from refiling (R. 766), in the October 21, 1999 hearing 
before Judge Reese, the same prosecutor then told just Reese that he "never never" 
received the expungement petition until after the fact, and that if the prosecution had 
received notice that he was trying to expunge his records, they "would have been in there 
objecting." (R. 1873 at 78; R. 131). 
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same scheme (R. 9-11, 62). 
After the prosecutors effectively violated Judge Palmer's and Judge Dever's rulings, 
i T ,
-
t : t
 • • v - r * BmKt-\. Juugc 
Reese reminded them that they could not proceed on the case until the remittitur arrived in 
the West Valley appeal (R. 156). 
Given the laA v and this h istoi 3 • of • :oi 11 t orders, the prosecutors certainly should have 
known better than i n;\it:\lk rdV: A -..*. 
The time and finances and anxiety the government has cost Mr. Norris with tins 
course of conduct cannot be calculated. As a direct result of the prosecution's disregard for 
" • '* • • 
research and writing seized. After he exhausted hia personal resources m nib ddVns; 
resorted to filing numerous pleadings pro se, and repeatedly sought the appointment of 
counsel in an effort to protect his rights when he became indigent. See, generally, e.g., R. 
36-46 . ' ' . • 
Given the escalation of the charges from four misdemeanors to twenty third degree 
felonies (with concomitant increases in bail), after Norris asserted his rights on appeal and 
siRYt/i Jul mi Ii.i i Ii I Ilit |j,ouii!iiiuii( s Mitccssive cases dismissed, and the record 
underlying f1- government's second ca>> rxninim \l. ^taHi^h.-s m-.^..
 : x\ 
vindictiveness, which also violates due process of law. See, e.g.. United States v. Sarracino, 
340 h.nl i < • - . i • Hr. 2003) (when prosecutorial functions are exercised to punish 
i • *. -. Ki\i i ti/i-i •> v-^stitutes prose, atonal vindictiveness); State v. 
I 
Brule, 981 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1999) (in selecting de novo standard of review for claim of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness, the court recognized, that "while all forms of prosecutorial 
misconduct may impinge to some degree on a defendant's right to due process, prosecutorial 
vindictiveness constitutes a particularly severe, prejudicial, and repugnant due process 
violation."). 
Given the history of prosecutorial harassment, vindictiveness, and oppression in the 
instant matter, this Court should order the information underlying Norris' convictions 
dismissed on due process grounds and forbid the government to proceed further against 
Norris in this case. See Brickey; American Honda, supra. 
C. THIS JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER IT WAS FULLY PRESERVED IN THE CONDITIONAL PLEA. 
The plea agreement in the file contemplates that Mr Norris has preserved this issue 
of the court's lack of jurisdiction over him (R. 1822).10 However, the plea colloquy creates 
some ambiguity with regard to this issue (R. 1883 at 14).n 
10The agreement provides: 
2. Defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights in relations to the 
case with the exception of narrow issues of the constitutionality of the 
charging statute and jurisdictional issues previously raised with the Court 
and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the Fourth District 
Court case, which is presently on appeal. 
(R. 1822). 
1
 during the plea colloquy, Judge Reese initially informed Norris that the only 
issue he was reserving for appeal was the overbreadth and vagueness of the 
communications fraud statute (R. 1883 at 13). Norris indicated that he had preserved 
the "jurisdictional issues objection," and when the court inquired, trial counsel indicated 
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Regardless of whether the issue was properly preserved in the conditional plea, the 
issue involves a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, both because the pendency of the West 
subject matter jurisdiction, see, ej^, High-Countrv sunn t, and because the prosecution's due 
process violations foreclosed jurisdiction from attaching when this case was refiled the last 
time, see, e.g., Morgan; American Honda, supra 
e.g., James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570-71 (Utah App. 1998) ("Jurisdiction of the subject 
matter is derived from the law It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the 
ac ::i is = d Ob jecti :)iit : 'the ji u isdiction> Df the com to\ ei the subject matter may be urged at any 
stage of the proceedings, and the right to make s-*v* uvtion , ; „ i.\. 
By reviewing Blackledge v. Perry, 4171s. S.21(1974), this Court can confirm that the 
due process violations which led up to and mcludeu IIIL filing of the final twenty charges 
regardless of whether the conditional plea expressly reserved the right to raise the issue on 
appeal. 
that he thought Norris was referring to the Fourth District Court case (R. 18SJ at 1 J). 
After further discussion, Judge Reese asked Norris if he understood he was waiving all 
issues specific to this case, anything that may have happened when Judges Reese or 
Dever had the case, and any ruling that either judge may have made, and was preserving 
only the constitutional challenges and any issue raised in the Fourth District Appeal that 
was not specific to this case (R. 1883 at 14) Norris agreed (R ! ss - at 14)? and then 
stated that he was only preserving challenges to issues of law, not of fact (R. 1883 at 15). 
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In Blackledge, North Carolina prosecuted Mr. Blackledge for a misdemeanor,. assault 
with a deadly weapon, and after he succeeded in obtaining a reversal on appeal, North 
Carolina prosecuted him for the very same underlying facts, but the second time charged a 
felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily injury. 
Id. at 22-23. After Blackledge pled guilty, he filed for habeas corpus in federal court, and 
the district court found that the prosecutor's conduct violated Blackledge's rights against 
double jeopardy, and that the entry of his plea did not foreclose his obtaining habeas relief. 
Id. at 24. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that while there 
was no evidence of prosecutorial malice in Blackledge's case, due process would not permit 
the potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness inherent in a process allowing prosecutors to 
have the power to refile cases with more serious charges after the appeals, and to thereby 
discourage people from exercising their appellate rights. Id. at 27-29. 
The Court found that Blackledge's guilty plea to the felony did not foreclose the 
courts from relieving him of the due process violation, because his case did not involve 
simple constitutional violations which occurred before he entered his plea. Id. at 30. Rather, 
his case involved "the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge." Id. 
Stated another way, "Having chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charge in the 
District Court, the State of North Carolina was, under the facts of this case, simply precluded 
by the Due Process Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to the more serious 
charge[.]"Id. 
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Blackledge is fully consistent with longstanding Utah law, which recognizes that the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction is always contingent on the proper filing of the 
information, see, e ^ , State v. Freeman, 71 I \ Jld I %, IW 11 Itali 1 K).\ IK and that a defendant 
who enter-- \ **-ui1ty plea does not wars re challenges to the coi ii t'spow ei It D adji idicatehis :ase 
or to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 
(Utah 1992). 
first four misdemeanor case was pending, and while the lower courts had no jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Hi-Country, supra. The prosecution's thrice repeated filings of more severe felony 
charges, and repeated disruptions <.< ^•;;•, i,u w.;,, the repeated arrests and other 
attendant pi oseci itc i lal :! smands See, 
Morgan, supra. Cf. Blackledge. 
Norris' pursuit of his appellate rights in the misdemeanor case, and his efforts to 
dismiss the felony cases and expunge the i ecoi (I c f the first dismissed case SIUJL.^ ; ;.wi have 
resulted in the prosecution's filing of more seven1 frlonv charges firsl dn, -
then twenty, or in the drastic increases in Norris' bail. Cf. Blackledge, supra. 
Because this case invoh es due process violations which should have foreclosed the 
i U
"
, M 4
 i.- * -ti *i i . i ced 
for him to come yet again to court to answer the more serious charges, this Coiii1 has full 
authority to address the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Blackledge, 
supra. 
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in. 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS ALL ASPECTS 
OF THE ARGUMENTS RAISED ON APPEAL. 
To the degree that the prior lawyers on this case did not preserve the issues discussed 
above, this Court should nonetheless address and correct the errors under the plain error 
and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong 
may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight 
than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Norris must demonstrate that trial 
counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that 
this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 521 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedlev, 2003 UT App 79 at % 10,67 P.3d 1005. 
The violations of law addressed herein should have been plain to the trial lawyers and 
the lower courts because the fundamental principles of law discussed in points I and II were 
well-established at the time of the violations, and just as the lower courts should have 
followed the controlling law, the trial lawyers had the duty to assert the law and issues on 
Norris's behalf. See, e.g., Smedlev, supra. 
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Because Norris would not stand convicted, and should never have been charged in the 
absence of the errors, the errors were highly prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the individual and cumulative errors undermining Norris' convictions, 
.;urt should order the uui coin t to permit Nonis u- „ undraw his pleas, and should 
or de t: th : iisfl ;i issa 1 • : i I k i ris5 case 
DATED April 27, 2004. 
El\zatMh 
Attorney for Mr 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Coiislilufiun n( i i|,ih Ann I" I \ 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of 
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
(\wstitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
\ o p.-* son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article i fc 'i 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel 
and unusual punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (1994) 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice pi it in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Tslo law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech oi of the press 
criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it 
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with 
good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have 
the right to determine the law and the fact. 
i 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of 
the State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in 
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption 
upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds 
vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the 
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or 
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be 
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in 
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county, 
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as 
provided by statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or 
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or 
ordinance may take effect. 
United States Constitution, Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
ii 
free exercise thereof ; or abridging the 'freedom of speech, or of the pi ess. or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to «uy\vci lor a capital, or otherwise infamous u .nics:> ^i. a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the UUK or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use. without just compensation. 
, n.l/ . i i " 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in 'the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
I 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed; 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced within two years 
after it is committed; and 
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is committed. 
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictmeir 
uu
'
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 or upon the filing of a complaint or information. 
I i f i l l I "otlt \ ! i , 'i II I I I > 1 , ' IHH) 
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(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1990) 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
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sought to be uuiamcu ib more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property; money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed $10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defra 
than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the! < •••>•• • -«-n-\ . !• r,
 J; ^ffrnsr tkNmlvd 
in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection ( i ; means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made oi n;.: 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the tilith 
Utah Code Ami. § 76-10-1801 (1995) 
(1) \ny person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the n opnh money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
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(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other 
than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described 
in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information, 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4(2003) 
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court having 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of 
an organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to 
the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, by specific negative 
averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, 
the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same 
vi 
on the trial. 
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant \\ hen a pait) cu c^> not know the name of an 
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party 
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name: provided, that when the 
true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be 
amended accordingly. 
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest 01 unkiu;v\n parties, in an aaion to 
quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the 
pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming 
any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto " 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice. 
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions 
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been 
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made 
specifically and with particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance 
or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver 
that the document was issued or the act done in compliance w ith law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign com t, judicial 
or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or 
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of 
jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party 
pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted 
jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For tiK j -^ j . se 01 icsung me suiiiciency of a pleading, averments of 
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated, 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state 
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise 
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation 
is controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the tr 0 «*^  fs< s^ 
showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance 
of any political subdivision thereof 01 a right deri\ed from such statute or ordinance, it is 
r\n M> refer to such statute 01 ordinance b\ its title an 1 the da\ o\^ its passage or by 
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its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or 
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(j)(l) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set 
forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter 
out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was 
published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party 
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken. 
(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may 
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating 
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification 
or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances. 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the 
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rales shall apply to all special statutory 
proceedings, except insofar as such rales are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a 
statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of the former Code of Civil 
Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with these rales. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rales shall not apply to proceedings in uncontested 
probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the 
joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Application to small claims. These rales shall not apply to small proceedings except as 
expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency. 
These rales shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing from or obtaining a 
review of any order, ruling or other action of an administrative board or agency, except 
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is 
in conflict or inconsistent with these rales. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rales of procedure shall also govern in any 
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rale, provided, 
that any rale so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or 
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is 
viii 
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or 
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need 
not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified 
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained 
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice 
need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended 
so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare 
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion 
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court 
may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A 
bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions 
as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited 
to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the 
particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained 
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception exci lse 01 pi o \ ' iso contained ii 1 till :: 
statute creating or defining the offense. 
(Ii) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless 
they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or informati 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based 
shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity 
but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon 
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the 
names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before 
the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a 
ix 
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.5 
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging 
multiple offenses, which may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or 
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-
1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the 
highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(l)(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not be separated 
except by order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or 
information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial 
entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
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Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley Citv, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NORRIS, RICHARD F. 
67 8 WILLIAMSBURG 
SANDY, UTAH 
5/15/55 
D e f e n d a n t . 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. C\ U\. I 0 0 4 ^ 1 ^ 1 m C L ; 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994, 
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah, 
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 3: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 4: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
MICHAEL MABRY 
BONNIE GESSEL 
JOAN MATTSON 
KAYLYNN CROSBY 
LISA STAUFFER 
SHERRY FRANCIS 
DOUG FAY 
xi 
00621 
DETECTIVE PLOTNICX**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL 
WITNESSES** 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant: bases this information on the following: 
WITNESSES STATED rO OFFICERS, THE DEFEN DANT ON FOUR DIFFERENT 
OCCASIONS, UNIxAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ANOTHER OR OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER, 
MONEY, PROPERTY, OR ANYTHING OF VALUE BY MEANS OF FALSE OR 
FRAUDULENT PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, OR MATERIAL 
OMISSIONS, AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH ANY PERSON 
BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME; 
THE DEFENDANT HAS NO BUSINESS LICENSE TO Q2ERATE IN WEST VALLEY AND 
NO CURRENT RESIDENCE. THE DEFENDANT' S^ Jtf*ffiREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN, 
THEREFORE, THE CITY R EQUESTS ft WARRANT^F .ARREST,, 
Complain 
9A-'253 76, DRf N0RRIS.R2 
PTC: , 
December ,19, 
Xll 
2 
f i f f f j ! : : o 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
Valerie J. O'Brien (6624) 
David L. Clark (6199) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3344 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT/ STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v. : 
NORRIS, RICHARD F . -
678 WILLIAMSBURG -
SANDY, UTAH • 
5 / 1 5 / 5 5 : 
D e f e n d a n t . : 
: A M E N D E D 
: I N F O R M A T I O N 
: C a s e N o . 9 4 1 0 0 4 9 2 9 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about MARCH, APRIL 
AND/OR MAY OF 1993, at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West 
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 93 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO MICHAEL MABRY BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN .MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
xiii 
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INDIRECTL Y TO' J OAN MATTSON BY AN Y MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 3- COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $3 00.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO LISA STAUFFER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS MAM MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $3 00.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO SUSAN HUNTER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
This Information 
following witnesses: 
is bas> evidence obtained from the 
MICHAEL MAJBRY 
BONNIE GESSEL 
JOAN MATTSON 
KAYLYNN CROSBY 
LISA STAUFFER 
SHERRY FRANCIS 
DOUG FAY 
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE LET US 
WITNESSES** 
SUSAN HI INTER 
KNOW IF THERE AR.E ADD ITIONAL 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information en i the following: • " • 
RICHARD NORRIS PLACED A NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT FOR A $1400.00 A 
2 
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MONTH SALARIED, WITH BENEFITS, POSITION FOR A DIET COUNSELOR, WHEN, 
IN FACT, THE POSITION HE WAS OFFERING TO THE VICTIM WAS NOT A 
POSITION OF THAT NATURE OR THE NATURE ADVERTISED OR SOLICITED OR 
PROMISED SUCH THAT: 
A. THE POSITION WAS NOT A SALARIED JOB WITH BENEFITS, OR 
B. THE POSITION WAS NOT AS A DIET COUNSELOR, OR 
C. THE POSITION WAS FOR COMMISSIONED SALES OF A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
D. THE CONTRACT MR. NORRIS REQUIRED WAS NOT, WHAT HE SAID IT WAS 
FOR AND AMOUNTED TO A DEBT OF OVER $309 TO EACH VICTIM THAT 
SIGNED IT, OR 
THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT APPROVED AS A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
THE AMOUNT OF PRODUCT SOLD TO THE VICTIM WAS MORE THAN THE 
AMOUNT AGREED UPON BY AND PROMISED BY MR. NORRIS, HENCE THE 
DEBT WAS GREATER THAN INTENDED 
MR. NORRIS, AFTER THE SALE, WOULD NOT ACCEPT RETURNS OF THE 
PRODUCT AS PREVIOUSLY INSINUATED, PROMISED OR AGREED, OR 
MR. NORRIS KNEW THAT THE PRODUCT WAS ' NOT WHAT HE STATED IT 
WAS, OR 
MR. NORRIS USED THIS SCHEME KNOWING PEOPLE COULD NOT LIVE UP 
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT, OR 
K. MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE 
VICTIMS, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THE VICTIMS TO MAKE MONEY FOR 
HIS COMPANY, OR 
L. MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY <3T~^UE OBLIGATION OF THE 
VICTIM, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THEJrVTT^IMS FOR THE FALSE 
VALUES OF THE PRODUCT.. 
H 
J 
Complainant 
94-25376, DR/CP, NORRIS.R2 
PTC: , 
October 2, 1995 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNIE W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARDF. NORR1S 
AKA 
Defendant. 
DOB 05/15/1955, 
Screened by: EW Jones 
1
 : ficdto: EW Jones 
BAIL: $75,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
!
.-,.N.. 9 6 1 ^ ^ f 
ine undersigned BrooK notnick ,\c^ ; t , sif„ inidci mill • lates 
on information and belief that the defendant 
COU NT I 
COMMUNICATION o rivAuu, a iliird Degree Felony , at 33^2 west JOUU e 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in ™ ,,,,',,iMn of Ti* 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as , *~ * defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORMS, a rart\ u, the offense, devised a to_defiaud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNTV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Fhird Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, In v iolation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from, another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the vo1,,~ - r *V 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUN r vii 
COMMUNICA I IONS FRAU D, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that 'the defendant, 
RICHARD F, NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00, 
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COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNTX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
B. Flotnick; S. HumK u. ucwci, .» vu ^,i > nunier; i-_. ci*. y, L 
Stauffer; K. Utley: S * - n vQ FmvH r " i ! , ^ n Duflfin <m.i s 
PRQH/ VBLE CAUSES I A I EMEN I i 
Your Affiant bases this Informal ii in iiiiii |n Ilin1 import /ifM ir\17(} mu\ ihr tollman)' 
1 During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran, an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employm 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defend 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised, i UL 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. me aeiuKdL . ^v^ai employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promise* m Uie ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant 
Subscribed aiu* .->worr ' * '*• this 
day of Octobci, k_ _. 
MAGISTRATE 
Authorized for presentmenwnd filing: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSO^D/strict Attorney 
Deputy'District Attorney, October 1, 1996 
jp/96016093 / 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNIE W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
ROLL CALL H - I 0 - T 9 0q0d 
JUDGE Q&J&Z. 
? 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS 
AKA 
OTN 
Defendant. 
DOB 05/15/1955, 
Screened by: EW Jones 
Assigned to: EW Jones 
BAIL: $75,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 9 7 1 O O S f c ^ F $ 
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Joan Mattson or to obtain from another Joan Mattson or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Mike Mabry or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Kay Utley or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Chris Atkin or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
xxn 
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COUNTV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Randy Hunter or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud Joy 
Slotsvic or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Kay Loemon or to obtain from Kay Loemon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNTVIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Sherry Francis or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Sherry Bailey or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Sue Hunter or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
B. Plotnick; S. Humphrey; B. Gessel; J. Mattson; S. Hunter; K. Crosby; M. Mabry; L. 
Stauffer; K. Utley; S. Francis; G. Fowler; K. Noland; D. Duffin and S. Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. „ . r \ _^-,^~~^ ^ 
^ . a WQgSC? 
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant 
Subscribed 
day of 
J^-
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney 
K. HILDEB 
Mu 
:y, M£ Deputy DistricyAttorney, arch 27,1997 
jp/96016093 
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing 
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County 
Prior related cases: None 
Officers Badge No. 8049 
Agency Case Number: 94-25376 
Arrest Date: 
Jail Booking Number: 
Defendant's Sex: Male 
Defendant's Social Security Number: 
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961 
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Ut 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST ]W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS 
DOB 05/15/55, 
OTN 
Defendant. 
Screened by: E. Jones 
Assigned to: E. Jones 
BAIL: $150,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
INFORMATION 
Case NoT 
710Z>$&> fc 
A 
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the <Mimds of: 
COUNT! C)T^ H L / 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a T^rr&TfSg^Mony, at 2392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense,'devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.06. 
COUNT HI X^h&Jl 0* 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Thirdfoe£iV>el^ny, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
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COUNTY 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
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COUNT ¥111 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as ;a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNTX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as ja party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
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COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XIV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT XV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT XVI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XVII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVIIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby, 
Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S. 
Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
^ C2 
BROOK PLOTNICK 
Affiant 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
Subscribed and sworn ^-ttfqre"fflftO}is IS 
day of May, 1997. J>\f^X ^ ^ 
MAGISTRATE \ t A:%r. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON^D/strict Attorney 
t/A '/TLA-. f*s-&^ 
Deputy District Atto: 
May 15,1997 
msy/97006614 
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing 
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County 
Prior related cases: none 
Officer's Badge No. 8049 
Agency Case Number: 94-25376 
Arrest Date: 
Jail Booking Number: 
Defendant's Sex: Male 
Defendant's Social Security Number: 
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961 
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS 
DOB 5/15/55 
Defendant. 
A M E N D E D 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 971008355FS 
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
FILED DIS ~ ^ T COURT 
Third Judk .District 
- * * = 
APR 16 1999 
8ALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
00218 
COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false 
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
xxxvni 
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COUNTV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
COUNTVI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT VIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNTX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
xl 
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COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, 
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. 
Duffin and S. Labaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of 
these people. 
xli 
00222 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
/ 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
r. 
-/l^^ L./ sns-**-
ERNESf W. JONES 
Affiant 
Subscribed 
day of April 
MAGISTRAL 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
Deputy District Attprney 
amended April 5, 1999 
msw/97006614 
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LOWER COURT RULINGS 
JUDGE WATSON'S SIGNED DOCKET ENTRY OF JUNE 6, 1996 DISMISSING 
WEST VALLEY CASE 
CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
iant Citation: 
D O C K E T Page 1 
THURSDAY JUNE 6, 19 9 6 
1:54 PM 
WVC Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
DRRIS, RICHARD F 
392 WEST 3 500 SOUTH 
EST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
City Misdemeanor 
Judge: EDWARD A. WATSON 
NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE 
es 
iolation Date: 05/12/94 
. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
:. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
Bail 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
iedings 
)/94 Case filed on 12/20/94. 
Warrant ordered 
WARRANT OF ARREST issued - JUDGE WBB 
Other: city warrant of arrest 
Bail amount ordered: 2000.00 
J/94 Warrant recalled on 12/28/94 because Booked 
J/94 942540092 Bail posted ========> check 2000.00 
Posted by: GAYLENE FOWLER 
5 09 3 WEST LONGMORE DR 
SLC UT 
3/94 ARR scheduled for 12/30/94 at 9:16 A in room 1 with EAW , 
Mis Arraignment JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON 
TAPE: 12546 COUNT: 3486 
ATD: None Present PRO: None Present 
Deft is not present 
PTC scheduled for 01/26/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Plea: Not Guilty 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Plea; Not Guilty 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Plea: Not Guilty 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Plea: Not Guilty 
DON BYBEE WAS PRESENT FOR DEF AN ENTERED NG PLEA. 
CASH BAIL WILL REMAIN AT $2 000 CASH. 
FILED RECEIPT OF CASH BAIL PAID $2000 RECEIPT 04727 
THE DEF CAME TO THE COURT WITH HIS ATTY, DON BYBEE, TO REQUEST 
A RETURN OF THE CASH BAIL. THE COURT ORDERED THE BAIL CHANGED 
TO BOND. UPON POSTING OF $2000 BOND, THE CASH BAIL MAY BE 
RETURNED TO THE DEF. 
6/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE) : .... JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON 
TAPE: 12631 COUNT: 682 xliii 
JLB 
JLB 
JLB 
JLB 
JLB 
LJB 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
SWU 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
LJB 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
X7 00624 
D O C K E T Page 2 
CIRCUIT COURT - WVC THURSDAY JUNE 6, 199 6 
1:54 PM 
ant Citation: WVC Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
)RRIS, RICHARD F City Misdemeanor 
'"95 Deft Present SMT 
ATD: None Present PRO: CLARK, DAVID SMT 
PTC scheduled for 02/16/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
DON BYBEE WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW. GILBERT ATHAY SMT 
WILL REPRESENT ATTY. PTC WAS CONTINUED. SMT 
'95 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - D MEL 
GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
FILED: REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - D GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
/95 FILED -, 1-25-95 - NOTICE AND ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL BY ATTY SDS 
DON L. BYBEE. SDS 
/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 12689 COUNT: 58 SMT 
Deft Present SMT 
ATD: ATHAY, D. GILBERT PRO: CLARK, DAVID SMT 
PTC scheduled for 03/29/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
PTC WAS CONTINUED. SMT 
/95 *******NOTE: CASH BAIL OF $2000.00 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE***** IHR 
/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 12831 COUNT: 1430 SMT 
Deft Present SMT 
ATD: ATHAY, D. GILBERT PRO: CLARK, DAVID SMT 
TRJ scheduled for 04/20/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
PTC WAS HELD. THERE WAS NO RESOLUITON. TRJ WAS SET. REQUESTED SMT 
VOIR DIRE AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE DUE 4-13-95. SMT 
1/95 FILED: MOTION BY CITY FOR CONTINUANCE. " SMT 
;/95 TRJ on 4/20/95 was cancelled SDS 
:/95 NOTE: TRJ RESET TO 5-8-95 AT 9 AM - MAILED NOTICE TO SDS 
ATD-D. GILBERT ATHAY AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE. SDS 
TRJ scheduled for 5/ 8/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
5/95 Accepted distribution CF $ 4.00 from Misc. Payments screen DSW 
1/9 5 FILED: MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE - D GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
J/95 NOTE: JUDGE RESET TRJ TO 6-8-95 AT 9 AM, MAILED NEW NOTICE TO SDS 
ATTY ATHAYS OFFICE AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE. SDS 
TRJ rescheduled to 6/ 8/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
1/95 FILED: MOTION TO WITHDRAW - D GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
2/95 NOTE: JUDGE WATSON HAS ALLOWED ATTY ATHAY TO WITHDRAW AS SDS 
COUNSEL TO DEFENDANT. ' SDS 
5/95 NOTE; CALLED ATTY ATHAY'S OFFICE AND INFORMED SECRETARTY JO SDS 
THAT THE JUDGE WILL NOT CONTINUE TRJ FROM 6-8-9 5 AND WILL NOT SDS 
SIGN THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM ATTY ATHAY UNTIL ANOTHER SDS 
ATTY IS PREPARED TO GO FORTH WITH THE JURY ON 6-8-95. SDS 
7/95 NOTE: ON 6-7-95 - JUDGE WATSON SIGNED THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW SDS 
ON ATTY ATHAY - AND CONTINUED THE TRJ TO 7-12-95 - TALKED WITH SDS 
ATTY MADDOX AND HE STATED THAT 7-12-95 WOULD BE FINE WITH HIM. SDS 
ATTY MADDOX HAS A PREVIOUS COMMITMENT ON 7-10-95. SDS 
TRJ rescheduled to 7/12/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
2/95 *******NOTE, DEF HAS CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS ***** IHR 
.5/95 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
6/9 5 FILED: REQUEST FOR FILL OF PARTICULARS - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
)7/95 FILED: REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
-0/9 5 TRJ on 7/12/95 was canceWed SMT 
00625 
D O C K E T Page 3 
IIRCUIT COURT - WVC THURSDAY JUNE 6, 199 6 
1:54 PM 
tjvt Citation: WV.C Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
IRIS, RICHARD F City Misdemeanor 
)5 TRIAL WAS CONTINUED AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEF ATTY. SMT 
FILED: FAX FROM ATTY MADDOX REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE. SMT 
55 FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS OR CONTINUE - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
35 FILED: LETTER FROM DEF'S ATTY, DAVID MADDOX IHR 
95 TRJ scheduled for 9/14/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
95 *****NOTE: CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE********* IHR 
95 NOTE: TRJ CONT TO 10-26-95 AT 9 AM, MAILED NEW NOTICE TO SDS 
ATTY MADDOX AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE. SDS 
TRJ rescheduled to 10/26/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
95 FILED: AMENDED INFORMATION DOA 
95 FILED REQUEST OR ORAL ARGUMENTS & EXPEDITED HEARING LJB 
FILED MOTION TO QUASH AMENDED INFORMATION AND STRIKE THE LJB 
INFORMATION ON FILE LJB 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED LJB 
INFORMATION LJB 
FILED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED LJB 
INFORMATION LJB 
95 NOTE; JUDGE SPOKE WITH ATTY MADDOX AS WELL AS ATTY STONEY SDS 
JURY TRL WILL BE SET ASIDE, AND WE WILL HAVE THE ORAL ARGUMENTS SDS 
AND MO HRGS IN ITS PLACE. LET ATTY STONEY KNOW AS WELL AS SDS 
ATTY MADDOX. SDS 
TRJ on 10/26/95 was cancelled SDS 
HRG scheduled for 10/26/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
'95 Hearing: JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 13529 COUNT: 1540 SMT 
Deft Present SMT 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: STONEY, KEITH SMT 
1781 - ATTY MADDOX ARGUED HIS MOTION TO QUASH AMENDED INFORMA- SMT 
TION AND STRIKE THE INFORMATION ON FILE. SMT 
C2 3 00 - ATTY STONEY RESPONDED SMT 
C3 371 - COURT FOUND. THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE... SMT 
THE COURT WILL" ALLOW THE ATTORNEYS TIME TO PRESENT MEMORANDA SMT 
AS TO WHETHER THE AMENDED INFORMATION IS ACTUALLY A NEW SMT 
INFORMATION AND IS THEREFORE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF SMT 
LIMITATIONS. SMT 
DEF WILL HAVE 10 DAYS TO PREPARE MEMO. PROSECUTOR WILL HAVE SMT 
10 DAYS TO RESPOND. DEF WILL THEN HAVE AN ADDITIONAL 5 DAYS SMT 
TO RESPOND. SMT 
/95 FILED MEMORANDUM LJB 
/95 *****CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE********** IHR 
/9 5 NOTE: REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED BY WEST VALLEY CITY. SDS 
/95 FILED; NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION - DAVID MADDOX CCE 
/95 FILED MOTION TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION LJB 
/9 6 LETTER MAILED TO BOTH ATTYS MADDOX AND STONEY REQUESTING SMT 
INFORMATION REGARDING JURISDICTION OF THIS CASE. SMT 
/96 FILED: LETTER FROM DEF'S ATTY, DAVID MADDOX IHR 
•/96 NOTE: *****CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE******** IHR 
796 HRG scheduled for 2/ 5/96 at 10:30 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
796 FILED: REPLY TO JUDGES REQUEST FOR RESPONSE REGARDING DOA 
DEGREE OF OFFENSE NOTE: WAS BROUGHT OVER FROM CITY ON 2/2/96 DOA 
Hearing: JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
V 
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D O C K 2 
.RD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
^ndant Citation 
NORRIS, RICHARD F 
THUkoLAY FEBRUARY 
Paae 4 
227 1996 
11:41 AM 
WVC Case: 941004929 
Agency No.: WVC 
City Misdemeanor 
MC 
05/96 142 TAPE: 13 8 74 COUNT: 
Deft not present 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: STONEY, KEITH 
WEST VALLEY CITY VS RICHARD NORRIS IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE INITIAL INFORMATION AS VOID ON THE BASIS 
IT IS LACKING SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT 
OF PERSONS ALLEGED DEFRAUDED AND THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE 
UTILIZED, PRECLUDING ABILITY TO PREPARE A DEFENSE. THE MOTION 
TO STRIKE WAS FILED SUBSEQUENT TO A DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A BILL 
OF PARTICULARS. THE CITY PROSECUTOR FILED AN AMENDED INFOR-
MATION. THEREAFTER, THE DEFENSE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH THE 
AMENDED INFORMATION ALLEGING AN INVALID OR VOID INITIAL 
INFORMATION CANNOT BE AMENDED CHARGING CRIMES NOW BARRED BY THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. THE COURT RECEIVED 
MEMORANDUMS FROM BOTH PARTIES. IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE 
VOLUMINOUS PAPERWORK SUBMITTED BY THE CITY, THE COURT BECAME 
CONCERNED WHETHER IT WAS EXAMINING MATERIAL THAT MAY NEVER 
BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE CASE AND MAY 
REQUIRE THE COURT TO RECUSE ITSELF FOR EXAMINING SUCH INVESTI-
GATIVE MATERIAL. AS IT ALWAYS DOES, IN REVIEWING A CASE, THE 
COURT REVIEWED TO CONFIRM JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE 
STATUTE 76-10-1801,U.C.A, 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH THE 
OFFENSES ARE CHARGED, INDICATES IN SUBPARAGRAPH TWO (2) 
THEREOF, "THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEGREE OF ANY OFFENSE 
UNDER SUBSECTION (1) SHALL BE MEASURED BY THE TOTAL VALUE 
OF ALL PROPERTY, MONEY, OR THINGS OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE 
OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION 
(1.) . . ' .'* THE INITIAL INFORMATION IS SILENT AS TO THE NUMBER 
OF VICTIMS AND MEASURE OF VALUE. THE AMENDED INFORAMTION NAMES 
FOUR VICTIMS IN FOUR COUNTS AND MEASURES VALUE OF MORE THAN 
$3 00 IN EACH COUNT. ON JANUARY 4, 1996, THE COURT SENT A 
LETTER TO BOTH PARTIES, MR DAVID MADDOX FOR THE DEFENSE AND 
MR KEITH STONEY FOR THE PROSECUTION, REQUESTING INPUT IF THEY 
DESIRED, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED 
FROM THE DEFENSE. NONE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CITY FOR THE 
COURT'S REVIEW PRIOR TO MAKING ITS DECISION THIS 5TH DAY OF 
FEBRUARY 1996. IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF 
JURISDICTION, THE COURT REVIEWED SOME OF THE INVESTIGATIVE 
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE CITY AND DETERMINED THE $1000 
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT FOR CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION HAD BEEN 
EXCEEDED. FOR EXAMPLE, A LETTER OF DEMAND FROM DEFENDANT 
NORRIS TO A SINGLE VICTIM OF FOUR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION 
DEMANDS $1,600. THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THE CIRCUIT 
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OF THE FELONIOUS ACTIONS ALLEGED 
IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION. AS A RESULT, THE COURT DOES NOT 
REACH THE ISSUE OF STRIKING THE INITIAL INFORMATION FOR 
VOIDNESS OR THE ISSUE TO QUASH THE AMENDED INFORMATION FOR 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS'AS RAISED BY THE DEFENSE. 
/06/96 C/O THE CASE DISMISSED. . . 
960250227 Refund .of bail.' .'•*.„• .CHK #: 011474 2000.00 
GAYLENE FOWLER," PAYOR_ OF. Cj^H.BALU. jRECIEVED CASH BAIL REFUND 
._ ^Ivi 
..riL. 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
IKR 
IHR 
.-_J5^.-*5&J 00627 
TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE WATSON'S RULING DISMISSING WEST VALLEY 
CASE 
case. 
Now, just this morning, although I have net had a 
chance to--to look at it in detail, I received from Mr. 
Maddox a fax document that seems to indicate — and I didn't 
read it in detail, but just seemed to~-a review, of some 
case cited that upholds that finding, that you look to the 
total of all of the matters in order to determine 
jurisdiction. 
MR. STONEY: Your Honor, I believe that 
probably would have been sent in response to my eleventh and 
a half hour, as of last Friday that was filed with the 
Court -
THE COURT: And I don't have yours. And 
for whatever reason, I don't have yours, your Friday thing 
in here; but — but anyway, the court finds, without reaching 
the issue to strike the initial Information, although I had 
pretty much done that in my previous ruling, since it 
appeared to me to be one that the Court could not go forward 
on; but rather than quash the second one and thus, I do not 
have to reach the decision of whether or not the statute of 
limitations has run and if this is felony, of course, it has 
not run, it could still then be filed with the District 
Court without meeting that issue; but ultimately this Court 
finds that it is without jurisdiction because of the 
amounts. 
5 
ALAN P. SM£jH::CSR 
385 BRAHMA ORlVsNeCTH 2S6-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
0682 
MR. MADDOX: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. 5T0NEY: Your Honor, can ---,* jet: i 
written finding with respect to chat, -.nd I would assume 
that even though the Court hasn't had it, since it was filed 
last week, the Court will just include the arguments the 
City made; I'm not going to object to the ruling at this 
point or anything, but--
THE COURT: well, I haven't received it, 
so I don't — but I'm not going to tile a written; that is my 
decision. 
MR. STONEY: Well, if the City decides 
to appeal, I've got to have something to appeal from. 
THE COURT: On the docket there. 
MR. STONEY: There's going to have to be 
something in writing to indicate w h a t — 
THE COURT: It will be on the docket and 
I will sign the docket. 
MR. STONEY: But what they'll do is 
they'll just send it back to the Court, your Honor— 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. STONEY: --asking for a more 
specific finding. 
THE COURT: No. My finding i: very 
specific, I do not have jurisdiet ion of this case because or 
trie amounts r q n r the aggregate of the four victims allegec 
ALAN PxkiiiH. CSR 
385 BRAHMA DPiVE ;8Cm 2G6-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
S«fPR)0683 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1G 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
!iere, ihat will be in the docket: and I will .;ign -hat docket 
and that becomes an appealable order. 
MR. MADDOX: Thank you, .: r.\iz Honor. 
MR. STONEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
ALAN PxJ^ ITH. CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
^ ^ ^ 0 0 6 8 4 
JUDGE PALMER'S RULING DISMISSING CASE NUMBER 961020866, AS 
QUOTED AND SUMMARIZED IN TWO PLEADINGS FILED BY PROSECUTION 
Moreover, Defendant was aware of the fact that his case was active on appeal and that the 
District Attorney intended to refile the felony charges once the misdemeanor charges were 
resolved. Defendant was not only aware that his case was still pending but actually argued at the 
preliminary hearing on felony charges before Judge Palmer on December 10, 1996 that he should 
not be required to proceed until the misdemeanor charges were disposed of on appeal. Judge 
Palmer agreed and stated, " I'm not willing to hear the felony preliminary hearing until the matter 
in West Valley has been completely disposed of by dismissal or otherwise." See, Prelim. Hearing 
Trans, p.7, 12/10/96. Thus, Defendant should not have been allowed to file for expungement of 
all records of his arrest, investigation, and detention for a case which is still pending on appeal. 
Defendant does not meet the requirements listed in § 77-18-10 (l)(c)(i-v) and § 77-18-12 (l)(g). 
Additionally, Defendant failed to comply with another provision of § 77-18-10 which 
states: 
(4) The petitioner shall file a certificate of eligibility issued by the division to be 
reviewed by the prosecuting attorney and the court prior to issuing an order 
granting the expungement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-10 (4) (1997). The District Attorney's Office never received a 
certificate of eligibility for expungement from the Defendant to review prior to Judge Hilder's 
decision to grant the expungement. If such a certificate had been received, the District Attorney's 
Office definitely would have objected to the expungement petition. 
The State is unable to comment upon why Judge Hilder issued the expungement order 
when the State was never informed of the petition nor given an opportunity to object in writing or 
at a hearing. Nevertheless, based on the clear language of the statute and the facts of the case, the 
order granting expungement of Defendant's records was improper. Therefore, this court should 
not enforce the expungement order against the State. A Defendant should not be allowed to use 
the expungement statute as a vehicle to block the filing of felony charges. Rather, once the 
Defendant's appeal on the misdemeanor charges is resolved, the State should be allowed to use all 
li 
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5. The felony charges were set for preliminary hearing on 
December 10, 1996. The defendant moved to quash the felony 
charges because the West Valley appeal was still pending and had 
not yet been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Judge Palmer 
granted the motion but advised the State that the felony charges 
could be refiled once the appeal was dismissed.. 
6. On March 1, 1997, the District Attorney was advised that the 
West Valley appeal had been dismissed. A copy of the order of 
dismissal was mailed to the District Attorney's Office from the 
Utah Court of Appeals. Based on the dismissal of the appeal, the 
District Attorney refiled felony charges on March 2, 1997. 
7. On April 11, 1997, the defendant moved to dismiss the felony 
charges because the remittitur had not been issued by the Court 
of Appeals. Judge Dever granted the defendant's motion but 
advised the State that charges could be refiled once the 
remittitur arrived. 
8. On May 9, 1997, the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
received the remittitur from the Court of Appeals and refiled 
felony charges on May 15, 1997. 
9. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges. Judge 
Robin Reese denied the motion to dismiss but stayed the 
proceedings so the defendant could appeal the ruling from the 
Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme 
Court denied the defendant's appeal and the defendant then 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The United States 
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JUDGE HILDER'S EXPUNGEMENT ORDER 
Third Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Petitioner 
frame: 
£>-/> -55 Date of Birth: 
Address: ? 3 9 2. Ut/ 3>S,?D 5 
M ^ 7 ~ i/..4LL£Y 
Phone: (sTys*///*r 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND 
ORDER OF EXPUNGEMENT 
AND SEALING 
Case No. 9& /JlL J90> C 
<?&/~7<S// 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-18-2, the Coi/rt, afterhearing. hereby makes the following findings 
and certifies as follows: 
1. That Petitioner was arrested/detained on A ? " 5 ' 6 (date) by ^^5"7~" ^ *-*-& ^/• /^ 
Haw enforcement agency) and/or charges were filed in this court on / 0 " / ~ *56> <date) under 
Case No. <?£ /0*5o%G><Z ; 
2. That petitioner has petitioned the court for an order of expungement and sealing; and 
3. That petitioner has complied with all statutory requirements for expungement in this case. 
Accordingly^ is HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. ThaVCgll recordpin petitioners case in the custody of this court, any other court, or any state, county or 
loca entity. agency"ofoflicial shall be EXPUNGED AND SEALED pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-18-
2: 
2. That petitioner shall distribute this order to all affected agencies and officials including this Court, the 
arresting agency, the booking agency, the Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons, the prosecutor's 
office and the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
3. That the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification shall forward a copy of this expungement order to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation if informatipa^regarding this offense was previously provided to that agency. 
DATED this J>/<£ day of 
OF U T A H ^ J J ^ ' - : ^ : 
i hereby 
Ifull 
such 
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JUDGE DEVER'S RULING DISMISSING CASE NUMBER 971005698 ON APRIL 11, 
1997 
1 episode or not, that issue is before the Supreme Court—I 
2 mean, before the Court of Appeals. 
3 Whether the defendant is using this as a ploy to 
4 delay his trial and allow him to continue doing whatever he 
5 wants to do is not an issue that makes a difference to this 
6 Court. 
7 The issue for this Court to decide is whether or not 
8 the Rules of Procedures and the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
9 limit what this Court is doing in this case. And I believe, 
10 from my reading of the rules, that this matter is presently 
11 pending in the Court of Appeals and until the Court of Appeals 
12 issues its remittitur, that this Court is prohibited from 
13 proceeding. 
14 Based upon that, I will grant the motion in this 
15 matter to dismiss without prejudice. This—West Valley and 
16 Salt Lake—I mean the State of Utah could then determine after 
17 the final issue is resolved whether or not you should go 
18 forward in West Valley or go forward by the State of Utah. 
19 MR. JONES: Just—just so I understand. Once we get 
20 the remittitur, we may re-file, is that— 
21 THE COURT: You may re-file— 
22 MR. JONES: Thank you very much. 
23 THE COURT: —once the remittitur i s — 
24 MR. PETERSON: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
25 MR. JONES: Thank you, Judge. 
27 
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JUDGE REESE'S ORDER OF MAY 22, 1997 DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE NUMBER 971008355 
MR. UPDEGROVE: June 12th, did you say, Mike? 
MR. PETERSON: I didn't. What do the dockets show, 
Marlene? 
MR. MADDOX: Can I be excused, your Honor? 
THE CLERK: June 12th at 1:30. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, just a second. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: June 12, 1:30 p.m. 
THE COURT: Here—here's what I'll do, to make it 
clear so that Judge Dever's not confused, and we have this in 
a little bit of context, I'm going to deny the defendant's 
motion to dismiss today. 
But I am going to grant a motion to recall the 
warrant, or at least, if no one has made the motion, I'll make 
my own motion, make it sua sponte, to recall the bench 
warrant—or the warrant of arrest, rather, pending the 
decision of Judge Dever on the—the dismissal of the earlier 
case, whether it is a dismissal with prejudice or a dismissal 
without prejudice. 
This case will be assigned to Judge Dever. We'll 
calendar it for that very date that he hears that case. And 
then he will decide, after having heard the motion to dismiss 
on the other matter, whether or not this case can remain 
pending. And—because the case would be his, in any event. 
I'd ask the State to prepare an order to that effect 
that would accompany the file so that when Judge Dever sees 
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it, it's—it's clear to him what had happened. When you 
prepare that order, submit it to Mr. Maddox for approval as to 
form. 
If we don't hear back any objection within ten days, 
I'll sign it. If there's an objection, then we'll—we'll go 
from there. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: All right, sir. 
MR. MADDOX: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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JUDGE DEVER'S RULING OF NOVEMBER 19, 1997 THAT HE WOULD NOT 
RULE ON MOTION TO DISMISS UNTIL THE REMITTITUR ISSUES 
to allow the 8355 filing to stand. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, do you want to respond to 
that? 
MR. JONES: Well, yeah, I just—I don't—I don't 
think you can. There's no question you dismissed the one case 
in April while we were waiting for the remittitur. Then we 
got word from the Court of Appeals that they were dismissing 
the appeal, so we went ahead and re-filed. That's the case 
that's still pending. 
And what you said at that time is, it's okay to re-
file, but I'm going to hold the warrant until we get a 
decision from the Court of Appeals, so that's essentially 
where we are. And if— 
THE COURT: And that's the position the Court is 
going to take in this matter. 
MR. JONES: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to dismiss any more cases, 
I'm not going to entertain any arguments on any cases until we 
have the resolution on the appeals resolved; so, I don't want 
to have cases set in front of me again and arguments, because 
I'm not going to hear them until I have a remittitur back from 
the Court of Appeals. 
MR. JONES: Thanks, Judge. 
MR. PETERSON: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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JUDGE DEVER'S RULING OF DECEMBER 4, 1998 DENYING MOTION TO 
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE, FINDING COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
1 reality we've got instructions from two different judges telling 
2 us when and under what conditions or circumstances we can go 
3 ahead and refile. 
4 JUDGE: Very well. I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss with 
5 prejudice in the case number 5698. That,case has been dismissed. 
6 The case number 971008355 I'll deny your motion to dismiss in 
7 that matter as well. 
8 ATD: Well, Judge, there are separate issues in 8355 relative 
9 to dismissal without prejudice. And, by the way, may I approach, 
10 Judge? I do have.. When you handed me back my expungement memo 
11 you also handed me the initial memo in that file. Your Honor, one 
12 point of clarification; I take it you're ruling that the statute 
13 is not unconstitutional. 
14 JUDGE: Oh, on the vague., vagueness matter? 
15 ATD: Right. 
16 JUDGE: Yes. 
17 ATD: Okay. Judge, did you want to entertain any argument at 
18 all on that issue. Do you think.. 
19 JUDGE: No. I believed that it's outlined clearly by both sides 
20 in your memorandums, and I've read through that, and I believe 
21 State's position is correct. 
2 2 ATD: Okay. I, I would point out then, again for purposes of 
23 appeal, that the State's example at the end of their memorandum 
24 on pages three and four is an example that clearly displays why 
25 the statute's unconstitutional. Mr. Jones cites a case where if 
2 6 you have communications with ten people and in each of those 
00773 
1 communications you obtain a hundred dollars each, then you have 
2 ten separate acts of communications fraud.. 
3 JUDGE: Urn-hum. 
4 ATD: But, you also have a felony. 
5 JUDGE: Urn-hum. 
6 ATD: Because first you count them ten times and then you 
7 aggregate it. Well, you can't have it both ways, Judge. The 
8 statute either has to allow an aggregation, a sum of a thousand 
9 dollars, in order to get you a felony level scheme, or it has to 
10 break it down as ten separate misdemeanor offenses at a hundred 
11 dollars each. And the very.. The very example that Mr. Jones 
12 articulates is the one that points most clearly to why the 
13 statute is facially unconstitutional. And procedurally, Judge, 
14 let's be clear where this case came from. Keith Stoney was the 
15 prosecutor in West Valley City that brought the action, and he 
16 said to Judge Watson, Judge I get to file ten separate 
17 misdemeanors if they're each a hundred dollar communications. And 
18 Judge Watson said no you have to aggregate it as one felony. Mr. 
19 Stoney filed an appeal saying no, no, no, each separate 
20 communication... 
21 JUDGE: Well, that has never been addressed. That appeal was 
22 dismissed. 
23 ATD: I understand. I'm telling you what he briefed. Every 
24 separate communication is a separate misdemeanor. That's how 
25 strongly the State felt in Judge Watson's court. 
26 JUDGE: Well, that's Mr. Stoney. 
A 9 
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ATD: I understand, but the point is Judge Watson, in that 
case, in a case that's sort of coequal law of the case, ruled no, 
it's one or the other. Either you aggregate it as a single felony 
offense or you have ten separate misdemeanors at a hundred 
dollars each. 
JUDGE: Urn-hum. 
ATD: And he dismissed the case and said go refile as one 
felony. Well, Mr. Jone's example is you either have the ten 
misdemeanors at a hundred or you have one felony at a thousand, 
but you don't have ten separate felonies because somehov/ the ten 
communications a dded up to one thousand. That's his argument 
here. 
JUDGE: Well, the statute says each separate communication is a 
separate act or offense. 
ATD: It does. 
JUDGE: And that's quoting from your memorandum. 
ATD: Well that's what the statute says. 
JUDGE: And the other part of statute says that the 
determination of the degree of any offense shall be measured by 
the total value of things to be obtained by the scheme. And the 
scheme is all of these separate communications. 
ATD: Right. 
JUDGE: That's the interpretation. 
ATD: Right. 
JUDGE: And therefore, if the total amount is a felony then 
each one of these separate communications is also a felony. 
20 
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ATD: And you're saying that's constitutional on it's face? 
JUDGE: Right. 
ATD: I see. 
JUDGE: Anything further? 
ATP: I think the next thing is we need to set a Prelim, if 
we can, and.. 
ATD: Well, Judge we do have the dismissal on case 8355 with 
and without prejudice. I know you've ruled that with prejudice 
won't be granted because the expungement doesn't bar refiling, 
the statute is constitutional and the vindictiveness hasn't been 
shown, but in 8355 we have the same basis for a dismissal in the 
case that we had in 5698, that is, an appeal was pending. It's 
simply that in 835.. 
JUDGE: An appeal is not pending anymore in this case. 
ATD: It's not anymore, and so it can be filed now. 
JUDGE: It's already been filed... 
ATD: But an appeal was pending when the case was first 
filed. 
JUDGE: 
ATD: 
JUDGE: 
ATD: 
Okay? 
It was.. 
Filed effective this date; is that what you're saying? 
Well, if that's what you'd like to rule. But the appeal 
was pending when 6355 was filed. 
JUDGE: And, so, what are you saying? 
ATD: Well, I'm saying that 8355, it wasn't properly filed 
because the appeal was still underway at the time. And the appeal 
lxi 
0077B 
1 process has run it's course, the matter can be filed, but it 
2 couldn't on the date 8355 was actually filed. 
3 JUDGE: Well it's properly before me now, is it not? 
4 ATD: If the State files it as of today. 
5 ATP: We filed it back in May 22nd of 90--, 1997 I believe. 
6 At least that's the latest one. And what happened was we filed it 
7 and the court said you can file the information but we'll take it 
8 under advisement for the time being until the appeals are 
9 resolved. 
10 JUDGE: Well, it gets filed when it's filed. Appeals have been 
Ll resolved. I believe it's properly before the court. 
L2 ATD: Judge, as of what effective date is it properly before 
L3 the court? Because when it was filed the appeals were still 
L4 pending in the West Valley case. And you dismissed 5698 for that 
L5 singular reason. You said don't be filing anything until the 
L6 appeals are done. 8355 was filed before the appeals were done. 
L7 ATP: Well, let's be clear. Judge, what you said was that we 
L8 couldn't file until the remittitur came back. Once we got the 
19 remittitur back, that's when we filed this latest case. In May of 
20 97. My recollection is as soon as we filed then Mr. Norris turned 
21 around and petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
22 JUDGE: Well I don't think there's anything that says that they 
23 can't file the information. I think that if there's an issue 
24 concerning whether or not it's properly before the court as an 
25 appeal and any hearing on that can be stayed. And I think that's 
26 what I said, that I'm not going to dismiss this and entertain no 
22 
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1 further motions until the remittitur is received. 
2 ATP: Right. 
3 ' JUDGE: The remittitur's been received so I think it's properly 
4 before the court. I don't have anything that says they can't file 
5 it, and therefore it's properly before the court. 
6 ATD: Well, Judge, what we agreed on the first time you 
7 issued your order dismissing the case was the concept that you 
8 can't file one set of charges when that same set of charges is 
9 pending in a duplicate file on appeal. And so you didn't: have 
10 hesitation dismissing 5698 on that basis. On essentially a double 
11 , jeopardy analysis basis. And the same thing applies in 83 55. 
12 There was a remittitur from our State's Supreme Court, a 
13 subsequent appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court in West Valley 
14 versus Norris, and the case was still on active appeal until the 
15 United States Supreme Court issue it's denial and remittitur. 
16 Once that occurs, then clearly West Valley versus Norris is over 
17 and 8355 can be filed. But the law we cited in our initial motion 
18 to dismiss, which you granted, is that you cannot have duplicate 
19 filings with the same charges when the first case is on appeal. 
20 (pause) 
21 JUDGE: Mr. Jones, what do you want to say about this? 
2 2 Anything? 
23 ATP: Well, Judge, in our memorandum we've outline the 
24 factual scenario that took place here, and what I have down on 
25 our second page, number seven, paragraph number seven is on April 
26 11th of 1937 you dismissed the felony charges because of the 
23 
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1 remittitur had not been issued by the court of appeal. You 
2 advised the parties the charges could be filed once the 
3 remittitur arrived from the Court of Appeals. A month later, in 
4 May of 97, the district Attorney's Office received the remittitur 
5 from the Court of Appeals and filed felony charges. Those charges 
6 are currently pending, but Your Honor had recalled the arrest 
7 warrant until a motion to dismiss could be resolved. The 
8 defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. 
9 That's the one we just argued. So it just seems to me that, that 
10 there was no question we can file the charges, we've done that. 
11 The remittitur came back. What stopped us after that point in 
12 time, in May of 97, is he then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court 
13 so it put us back on hold. Cause even though the remittitur had 
14 been issued they recalled the remittitur later on because this 
15 case had gone up on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
16 JUDGE: Okay. The remittitur was issued and you filed 
17 (inaudible) and before May 15th. If you filed on May 15th then 
13 that's the date. 
19 ATP: Right. That's the date the warrant was signed was May 
20 15. 
21 JUDGE: You want to set this matter for Preliminary Hearing at 
22 this time? 
23 ATP: That'd be fine. 
2 4 JUDGE: How much time do we need to do this? 
2 5 ATP: Judge, I think we probably ought to have a special 
26 setting if we can. We probably got anywhere between eight and ten 
24 
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JUDGE PALMER'S RULINGS OF APRIL 2, 1999, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS AND BINDING OVER ON TWELVE 
COUNTS 
It could have been called to his attention. 
It's up to this Court to determine the—the date of 
filing and I would find that the filing date in this case is 
May 15th of 1997, after the case in West Valley had been 
dismissed. The—the proceedings were then stayed by Judge 
Reese, pending the results of the defendant's appeal and as I 
understand the law, when an appeal is made, then the—the 
statute of limitations are tolled. That just makes sense and-
-and comports with the inner suggestus, simply because the 
defendant cannot profit by his own delays in the case. 
So, I specifically find that he is not put in 
jeopardy twice, because the West Valley case had—had already 
been dismissed. 
The final re-filed Information, as of May 15th, 
1997, alleges offenses occurring during a time period ending 
June of 1993, which is within the four-year limitation period. 
The defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of expiration 
of the statute of limitations is therefore denied. 
We'll now proceed to hear arguments as to the merits 
of the case, if you wish to do that. 
Who wants to go first? Mr. Jones, do you want two 
chances or do you just want to respond to Mr. Peterson? 
MR. JONES: I'm willing to just respond, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Peterson, each side just gets 
one chance then. 
Ixv22 
1 All right. The purpose of the Court today is to 
2 find whether or not there's probable cause to determine if the 
3 twelve counts as alleged, and remaining, have been committed 
4 and that the defendant committed them and if there's 
5 sufficient evidence to bind the evidence over for a finder of 
6 fact. 
7 And I'm doing this with the most recent Supreme 
8 Court cases in mind. As you know, a hearing magistrate is now 
9 limited somewhat in—in what evidential—evidentiary findings 
10 a magistrate can make. 
11 In this case, the defendant is charged in twelve 
12 counts of devising a scheme or artifice—artifice to defraud 
13 another. All the—the witnesses testified as to a common 
14 thread here, all answered an ad promising or representing that 
15 they'd be making up to or at least fourteen hundred a month 
16 plus benefits. All answered that same ad. 
17 When they met with Mr. Norris, he offered them the . 
18 job and put two papers in front of them, which they were not 
19 allowed to take home and read, before they signed. That he 
20 told them it was necessary to sign it immediately. All of 
21 them, virtually, testified that they didn't have time to read 
22 it, but based on his representations, they went ahead and 
23 signed these papers, which, contrary to their belief that they 
24 would be an employee entitled to salary and benefits, told 
25 that they would be independent contractors. 
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One witness, that is Joy Slotsve, did testify that 
she did understand that she was an independent contractor, but 
the defendant made further misrepresentations to her status as 
a medical consultant. 
The Court finds there is evidence from which a 
finder of fact could find that the defendant made at least two 
communications with these people. And according to the 
Court's notes, all of these people met with the defendant in 
the latter part of May of 1993, except Kay Utley Lemmon, who 
indicated as to a date, only that she answered an ad in the 
paper in April of 1993, and subsequently met with the 
defendant. 
So, the Court would find that there is sufficient 
evidence that these offenses all happened with the statutory 
period. 
As further evidence of the defendant's intent on 
this matter, to—to misrepresent the situation and make 
fraudulent representations are the—the testimony of Karen 
Noland, that she worked for the defendant in 1995 and 1996, 
and he told her that there was no way any of these people 
would be paid because no one could meet the quota and the 
defendant would earn his money by suing the sales people. He 
called her to destroy records. He left town for about two 
weeks when his arrest was imminent and also had her prepare 
false evidence. 
36 
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1 I Based on the evidence, the Court finds probable 
2 I cause to believe that the offenses as alleged in the remaining 
3 twelve counts have been committed and that the defendant 
4 committed them. He is therefore ordered bound over for trial 
5 on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 19 and 20. 
6 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, relative to the level of 
7 offense in each of those eight counts— 
8 THE COURT: Bound over as felonies. 
9 MR. PETERSON: Okay. Did the Court want to recount 
10 specifically the basis for the ruling on some of the value 
11 o r — 
12 THE COURT: The ruling is that the State has made an 
13 allegation that the fourteen hundred dollars which was offered 
14 each victim as salary meets the threshold for a felony count 
15 and they are entitled to prove that before the finder of fact, 
16 or attempt to prove it. 
17 Okay. Anything else? 
18 MR. PETERSON: Let's see, a date, your Honor? 
19 THE CLERK: April 16th, at 10:30 before Judge Noel. 
20 THE COURT: And the defendant is released a s — 
21 MR. JONES: Judge, I—-
22 THE COURT: —presently released. 
23 MR. JONES: — I would like the Court to consider one 
24 other matter. Mr. Norris had asked that the Court appoint a 
25 public defender to represent him, claiming that he was 
37 
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JUDGE PALMER'S WRITTEN RULING ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER REGARDING STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
Case No. 971008355FS 
Hon. Phillip K. Palmer 
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Statute of Limitations came on for 
hearing on April 2, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer. The State was 
represented by Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney. The defendant was present and 
represented by Michael R. Peterson, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. The Court having 
considered the memorandum of law and the oral arguments of counsel enters the following 
Findings of Fact: 
1. The defendant was originally charged on October 1, 1996 in Third District Court 
with felony counts of Communication Fraud pursuant to Section 76-10=1801, U.C.A. by the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney. 
2. Those charges were quashed on December 10, 1996 by Judge Phillip Palmer 
because the West Valley misdemeanor case involving the same charges was still on appeal. 
3. The felony charges were refiled on March 2, 1997. Judge Lee A. Dever 
dismissed these charges on April 11, 1997 because the remittitur had not arrived from the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
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FILEB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 8 1899 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 1 P i ^ 
By AJOAA^J^r 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Case No. 971008355FS 
Page 2 
4. Felony charges were refiled on May 15, 1997 once the remittitur arrived at Third 
District Court. Judge Robin Reese stayed those charges while the defendant appealed the West 
Valley case to the Utah Supreme Court. 
5. The defendant appealed the matter to the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court. 
6. A remittitur was issued on October 30, 1998 from the United States Supreme 
Court denying the defendant's appeal and remanding the case. 
The Court enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Statute of Limitations is denied. 
2. The filing date is May 15, 1997 for the felony charges. 
3. The filing date is not October 30, 1998. Judge Dever never signed the 
defendant's proposed order requesting that filing date be October 30, 1998. 
4. The motion to quash and the appeals filed by the defendant toll the running of the 
Statute of Limitations in this felony case. 
5. The defendant never suffered double jeopardy because he was never tried for the 
West Valley misdemeanor case. 
Michael R Peterson 
Counsel for Defendant lxx 
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ORDER REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
CaseNo.971008355FS 
Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Regarding Statute Of 
Limitations was delivered to Michael R. Peterson, Attorney for Defendant RICHARD NORRIS, 
at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 7 ^ - d a y of April, 1999. 
-/hufttllp. wntMhs 
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JUDGE REESE'S RULINGS ON OCTOBER 21, 1999, DENYING MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND THAT EXPUNGEMENT ORDER DID NOT BAR USE OF 
EXPUNGED POLICE REPORT 
said, well, we want you to grant it with prejudice. The 
remittitur was—was still pending at that time, and I think 
I — 
MR. NORRIS: It was recalled. It was recalled 
because we initiated (inaudible) by the Utah Supreme Court. 
THE COURT: Yeah. That's what I was about to say. 
It looks like the action in this—in this case, the—the one 
the State characterizes as the second filing, case ending--
MR. SKORDAS: Right. 
THE COURT: — 5 6 9 8 , was an effort by the defense to 
have the dismissals be with prejudice— 
MR. SKORDAS: Correct. 
THE COURT: — a s opposed to without. 
MR. SKORDAS: Correct. 
THE COURT: All right. It would appear to me that 
the second case, the 5—the one ending 5698, was dismissed, in 
fact, o n — i n April of 1997, and that the one that the State 
characterizes as the third case, which is the one at hand 
here, 8355, was filed in May of 1997. 
I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss, Mr. Norris. 
It would seem to me that the State filed this lawsuit in May 
of 1997. There's no reason t o — t o assume a different filing 
date than the actual filing date. Even though you were 
attempting to stop West Valley from—from dismissing their own 
appeal o f — o f an earlier dismissal, I don't know that your 
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1 effort to keep those West Valley misdemeanors alive, which is 
2 in fact what it was, would prohibit the State from filing the 
3 felonies, when the prosecutor in those misdemeanor cases 
4 wanted them dismissed. 
5 I—I can't see any good legal reason to—to permit 
6 that result, or any good policy reason to permit that result. 
7 West Valley may have made a mistake initially in filing the 
8 appeal, but after they chose to withdraw that appeal, then it 
9 seems to me the State's permitted to file its new felony cases 
10 and the mere fact that you've kind of kept that ball in the 
11 air, as I analogized earlier, would not prohibit them from 
12 filing the lawsuit. 
13 So, I'll deem the filing to be as of May of 1997, 
14 well within the period of the statute of limitations and deny 
15 your motion to dismiss. 
16 MR. SKORDAS: Your Honor, Mr. Norris has asked me to 
17 ask the Court if he could address the Court briefly. 
18 THE COURT: No, sir. No. I'll hear from your 
19 attorney on these arguments, sir. 
20 Now, there's a second motion filed by the defendant 
21 and that's the motion to—in effect, it looks to me like a 
22 motion to—to suppress evidence. And maybe I understand it, 
23 I—I think I read it carefully, but it would appear that 
24 because the arrest of Mr. Norris was expunged, that the 
25 evidence is—of—of the police officers' investigations prior 
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THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand. Did you 
have anything else? 
MR. JONES: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The—the Ambus case is a — k i n d — a n 
appeal from a decision by the Utah State Board of Education to 
revoke Mr. Ambus' teaching certificate based on some things 
that they had learned about, that occur after Mr. Ambus had 
had an expungement of his conviction, if I'm not mistaken. Is 
that what it says? Is that the—is that that case? 
MR. SKORDAS: Yes. 
THE COURT: A different situation here. I'm not 
prepared to rule today that once an arrest has been expunged 
that all police memory as well as the reports and everything 
that may have been compiled beforehand are obliterated and the 
investigation is required to begin anew. That's not what 
Ambus says. It's limited to its facts, it would seem to me. 
And when the officers presented this case to the 
District Attorney in May of 1997, they were pro—they were not 
prohibited from repeating, as a part of the screening process, 
information they had learned before the expungement order was 
signed. 
I don't think that's what the expungement law 
anticipates and I don't believe that's what the Ambus case 
says. So, again, I'll deny the motion to suppress the 
evidence the police had obtained before the expungement. The 
lxxiv 
1 J State can rely on that evidence at the trial. 
2 Now, evidence of Mr. Norris' arrest certainly have 
3 been expunged and the State can't use that evidence against 
4 him, because it has been expunged; but information obtained 
5 from witnesses and compiled before the expungement, the 
6 State's not prohibited from using. That's my ruling today. 
7 MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Now, M r . — 
9 MR. SKORDAS: I do have one other motion that's 
10 pending. 
11 THE COURT: And what was that one? I didn't s e e — 
12 MR. SKORDAS: It's a supplemental request for 
13 discovery. 
14 THE COURT: Oh, yes. There is that one. 
15 All police reports required in connec—acquired in 
16 connection with the case. All visual—audio and visual 
17 recordings of any witnesses interviewed in connection with the 
18 case. 
19 Let's start with those two. Do you have any 
20 objections supplying those? 
21 MR. JONES: I think we've supplied all that, haven't 
22 we? 
23 MR. SKORDAS: And they've already indicated they 
24 have no objection to those two. It's the third one that we're 
25 here on. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 Defendant challenges his conviction for 
communications fraud under Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-10-1801 (Supp,199Q> IFN11 (the 
communications fraud statute). 
F N L -
Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial 
was insufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict on 
the communications fraud count. "[W]e will reverse a 
jury verdict only when ... we find that the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
lxxvi 
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unreasonable and unjust." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT 
App 134 *2. 17 P.3d 1153 (second alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
To obtain a conviction under the communications fraud 
statute, the State must prove the following elements: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another 
money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person 
by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed 
$100,000; 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection 
(1) means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, 
impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or 
to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include, but are not 
limited to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, 
radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken 
and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section 
unless the pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-180im(dV (6 \ CI). We 
review "the evidence and all inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict." State v. Hoteate, 2000 UT 74/jj 18, 10 P.3d 
346. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he devised the fraudulent scheme and 
communicated it to the victim. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1), (6). Among other things, Defendant 
argues that because the victim learned of the investment 
scheme from Lance Hatch and Lee Walker, he did not 
devise, nor communicate, the investment scheme to the 
victim. However, the jury heard evidence that 
Defendant had knowledge of the investment scheme; 
was involved in the scheme; directly told the victim that 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
he was running the investment; told the victim that the 
investment was "a sure thing"; instructed Walker to 
divert $50,000 of the victim's investment into 
Defendant's personal bank account without telling the 
victim that he diverted the $50,000 into his personal 
bank account; and spoke with the victim five or six 
times by telephone concerning payment on the victim's 
investment. 
*2 Defendant may disagree with the evidence 
presented, but "[he] is not entitled to reversal of [his] 
conviction simply because [his] version of the facts is 
different from the State's [version of the facts]." State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 544 (Utah 1994V "After 
reviewing the evidence presented against [Defendant], 
we are not convinced that it is so lacking as to ' "make 
the Oury'sl verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." ' " 
Strinzham, 2001 UT App 13 at If 30 (second alteration 
in original) (citations omitted). 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Defendant's 
conviction. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH and PAMELA 
T. GREENWOOD, Judges. 
2003 WL 22922435 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 425 
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